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In this dissertation, public and private ownership is compared on the basis of 
allocative and productive efficiency. At the outset, it is shown how the traditional 
advantage of owner-managed private firms over their public counterparts in respect 
of productive efficiency is weakened by the presence of allocative inefficiency in 
the private sector, due to market failures such as imperfect competition. The case 
of the natural monopoly is especially important, because there is no scope for 
improving allocative efficiency by increasing competition. Governments attempt to 
address this problem by regulating or nationalising these monopolies and then 
enforcing a policy of managerial cost pricing, albeit at the expense of productive 
efficie
0
ncy. However, the gains in' allocative efficiency are lessened by the use of 
public firms by politicians as political instruments to further their personal interest. 
As a result, public failures in the form of an over-supply of public goods are 
created. A compr~mise between the allocative inefficiency in the owner'-managed 
private sector and the productive inefficiency in the public sector emerges with the 
rise of the private managerial firm. Distinctive characteristics of the manag_erial 
·firm, such as the separation of ownership and control, provide the necessary 
incentives to reduce monopoly prices and expand output, thereby moving closer 
to the allocatively efficient position. Although productive efficiency is sacrificed to 
some extent in the process, the incentives inherent to private ownership ensure 
that the comparative advantage of the private managerial firm vis~a-vis the public 
firm is maintained. The net efficiency effect of the private managerial firm is 
therefore expected to represent a higher level of social welfare than that of the 
public firm. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCllON 
This dissertation is aimed at performing a comparative analysis of the economic 
consequences of public and private ownership in a modern economy. For this 
purpose we shall distinguish between allocative and productive efficiency and 
consider how their relative importance might vary with different patterns of 
ownership. The conventional rationale for public ownership, and thus for the rise 
of the public enterprise, derives from the perceived lack of allocative efficiency in 
the private sector, in the form of the undersupply and overpricing of goods and 
services. 
Allocative inefficiency was supposed to be a characteristic feature of natural 
monopolies producing socially important goods and services. However, the growth 
of the public sector, introduced a different kind of failure, i.e. public failure, 
resulting in an oversupply of public goods. It will be argued that public failure was 
partly caused by factors inherent to public ownership such as the separation of 
ownership and control, the self-interested behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats, 
and the use of the public enterprise as a political instrument. While both the 
conventional private firm and the public enterprise brought about allocative 
inefficiency, albeit in different ways, the rise of the private managerial firm offered 
a potential solution by raising output to competitive levels as a result of the 
existence of contestable markets, and the pursuit of goals other than profit 
maximisation, e.g. sales maximisation and social responsibility. 
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Compared to the private sector, the public sector, furthermore, has a poor track 
record regarding productive efficiency. Possible causes thereof are escalating 
pressure from trade unions, the lack of managerial motivation and incentives, 
insufficient performance monitoring, too little spending on research and 
development, and rent-seeking costs. Although the concentration of ownership in 
the private sector may also give rise to productive inefficiency, we shall argue that 
private ownership, in the form of the modern man~gerial firm, is preferable to 
public ownership if the full effect on allocative and productive efficiency is to be 
taken into account. 
At the outset it is important to explain the difference between allocative and 
productive efficiency and to state clearly what we mean by the organisational 
structure of the firm to be considered. 
Allocative efficiency: 
Black and Dollery ( 1992:2-3) define allocative efficiency broadly as an efficient 
allocation of scarce resources amongst alternative uses, giving rise to production 
bf the optimal mix of commodities. Under perfectly competitive conditions, the 
optimal output mix results from consumers responding to prices which reflect the 
true costs of production, or marginal social costs. Allocative efficiency involves 
an interaction between the production capacity of the economy and the 
consumption activities of individual consumers. Allocative efficiency in the Pareto 
sense, would be attained in perfectly competitive markets where there are no 
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uncertainties, externalities or increasing returns if and when the following three 
conditions are simultaneously fulfilled. Firstly, production must be efficient in the 
sense that no inter-sectoral re-allocation of resources could increase the output of 
any commodity without decreasing the output of any other commodity. Secondly, 
consumption must be efficient in the sense that no interpersonal re-allocation of 
commodities could increase the utility of any consumer without decreasing the 
utility of any other consumer. Thirdly, production and consumption efficiency must 
be achieved simultaneously. 
Allocative inefficiency can present itself in different forms. A distinction can be 
made between consumer-driven and producer-driven inefficiency. Consumer-driven 
inefficiency could be caused by consumers acting collectively and insisting on too 
low prices and too high output levels. This cause, however, is not very common 
because of the free-rider problem as well as the usual absence of a strong solidarity 
amongst consumers. More common is the other extreme whereby allocative 
inefficiency is caused by the lack of consumer sovereignty and the inability of 
consumers to reveal their needs and preferences. 
In this dissertation the emphasis will be placed on producer-driven allocative 
inefficiency. This firstly occurs in the event of a market failure, e.g. a concentration 
of market power or trade union pressure, enabling or forcing producers to raise 
prices above marginal cost and by reducing output below its optimal level. 
Secondly, such inefficiency also occurs where a public enterprise is obliged to 
lower its price and expand output in order to achieve certain social aims, or 
4 
because of the presence of certain externalities. 
Productive efficiency: 
In respect of productive efficiency (also called operational or X-efficiency), Harvey 
Liebenstein (1966:407-413) contended that for a variety of reasons people and 
organisations normally work neither as hard nor as effectively as they could. He 
showed how the absence of strong competitive pressures reduces the incentive of 
firms .to ·maintain full internal efficiency and instead allow their unit costs to rise 
above competitive levels. Firms therefore operate within the outer bound of the 
production possibility curve consistent with their resources. If, by reason of certain 
motivational factors, the work-force can be encouraged to work harder and release 
more energy, the firm could considerably improve what Liebenstein calls its 
X-efficiency. He argued that the pressures of competition would ensure the firm 
remains close to its production possibility frontier as determined by the chosen 
combination of resources and available technology; He also suggested that "many 
people will trade the disutility of greater effort, of search, and the control of other 
peoples' activities for the utility of feeling less pressure and of better interpersonal 
relations" (Liebenstein, 1966:407). Liebenstein believed that X-efficiency could be 
improved by promoting competitive forces as well as "other motivational factors". 
·This dissertation deals with the effect of such other motivational factors, inherent 
to ownership, on the productive efficiency of the firm. 
The extent of productive efficiency in a private or public enterprise will depend on 
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its ownership and managerial or organisational structures. The organisational 
structure of the firm invariably influences not only managerial motivation and 
incentives, but also the degree of performance monitoring in the management of 
the firm. Performance incentives and performance monitoring, which will be dealt 
with below, are the two most important factors in determining the level of 
productive efficiency within the firm. Such an analysis is consistent with the 
"property rights" school (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972:1137-1162), which rejects 
profit maximisation as the leading behavioural incentive, and instead focuses on the 
relationship between ownership rights, incentives and economic efficiency with 
special emphasis on managerial behaviour based on the pursuit of personal 
interests. Whilst the neoclassical theory focused on the rights of owners, rather 
than on those of managers, the "property rights" school argued that property rights 
of owners in the modern managerial firm are more attenuated, rendering less 
control over managers and employees, and leaving the latter with a greater freedom 
to pursue personal objectives through discretionary behaviour (Killick and 
Commander, 1988: 1470). 
The basis of the conflict between these theories could be found in their different 
views on the definition of the firm, and specifically its organisational structure. The 
neoclassical theory of the firm deals with the relatively small owner-managed firm 
operating in a competitive environment. There is little separation of ownership and 
control, and owner-managers will set high standards for productive efficiency and 
will control and monitor the operation of the firm strictly in accordance with their 
goals of profit-maximisation. The same is true of the concentrated ownership firm 
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in which one person or an organised coalition of persons owns a controlling interest 
in the firm and exercises direct and strong control over its management (Monsen 
and Downs, 1972:349). The "property rights" school, on the other hand, bases 
its theory on the modern managerial firm, defined as a large corporation, usually 
consisting of more than one firm, with management separated from the 
shareholders who exercise their control via a board of directors. 
Ultimately the issue to be addressed in this dissertation is whether and to what 
degree the change in ownership, i.e.· from public to private or vice versa, of the 
modern firm will affect allocative and productive efficiency in the economy and 
thereby the level of social welfare. In the past, economic literature has confused 
the move towards private ownership (privatisation) with the move towards stronger 
competition (liberalisation). It is sometimes argued that privatisation will enhance 
efficiency in the economy only if coupled with the liberalisation of the market. In 
fact these are two separate issues and should be treated separately. There is also 
no necessary link between the two. Public enterprises may operate in a 
competitive market while private enterprises may figure as natural monopolies with 
extensive monopoly power. Any shift of the public monopoly to the private sector 
would not per se in.valve the opening up of that particular market. By definition, 
the natural monopoly renders very little scope for the improvement of competition. 
In this dissertation emphasis will be placed on the natural monopoly and the effect 
of a change in ownership on efficiency. It will be assumed that such an analysis 




CONVENTIONAL VIEW: MARKET FAILURE AND RISE OF THE 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
2. 1 MARKET FAILURE - A SYNOPSIS 
The neoclassical theory of perfect competition assumes the existence of fully 
informed, completely mobile consumers and producers striving to maximise their 
own utility or profit within perfectly competitive markets. It is further assumed that 
the invisible hand will guide the perfectly competitive market to a position of 
equilibrium where prices equal marginal social costs. These assumptions are, of 
course, patently unrealistic. The inability of the market system of any economy 
to achieve allocative efficiency when left to itself, could be ascribed to those 
situations, referred to as market failures, in which the invisible hand is prevented 
from allocating resources efficiently. There will thus be a tendency for the market 
to produce too many of some goods and an insufficient amount of others. 
It is the identification of market failures with allocative inefficiency that provided 
the main thrust for the formation of public enterprises and other forms of 
intervention in both developed and developing countries. It was thought that the 
government would be in a better position effectively to correct the imbalances (i.e. 
allocative inefficiency) caused by these market failures if it transferred ownership 
of the enterprise to the public sector. The rationale behind the policy of 
nationalisation was in fact that government would be in a position to adjust and 
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enforce the key variables aimed at enhancing allocative efficiency in the economy. 
The most important manifestations of market failures are the f.ollowing: (a) 
inadequate information; (b) inability of the private sector to provide public or 
collective goods and services; (c) a lack· of control over the external effects of· 
production; (d) an inequitable distribution of income and wealth; and (e) the 
presence of monopolies and other forms of imperfect competition (Falkena, 
1981 :290-291 ). In this dissertation the focus will be on the latter market failure. 
Together, these factors provided the theoretical justification for the proliferation of 
public enterprises and the extension of the public sector in the period between 
1950 and 1980 (Killick and Commander, 1988:1466). In developing countries 
thousands of public enterprises were created, accounting for over a quarter of 
gross fixed capital formation in the 1980's (Van de Walle, 1989:603). It will be 
argued in this dissertation that market failures are indeed failures of the market and 
not failures of ownership. The factors contributing to market failure do not 
necessarily result from the form of ownership, i.e. private ownership. 
The phenomenon of market failure has been thoroughly discussed and well 
documented in the literature. The arguments relating thereto will not be repeated 
here and, for the purposes of this dissertation, the following brief explanation of 
the most important manifestations of market failures listed above will suffice. 
Firstly, adequate information necessary to make rational decisions in the market is 
either not available or only available at high costs to consumers or producers. This 
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may cause producers to be ignorant of better technologies or other lower cost 
resources than those used in their plants. Consumers may be unaware of the 
cheapest available price for the goods and services they buy or of the latent 
harmful properties thereof, which can only be known at additional costs. The 
result of inadequate information is that producers operate inside their production 
possibility curve while consumers find themselves on suboptimal indifference 
curves. Governments in free societies have generally assumed the responsibility 
of informing individual citizens by forcing producers through regulation and quality 
control to disclose certain information and maintain specific standards (Black and 
Dollery, 1992: 1 0). These measures could be enforced on private producers, and 
public ownership is certainly not a prerequisite. 
Secondly, the existence of public goods in the market has been identified as 
another factor contributing to the allocative inefficiency in the private sector. The 
key features of pure public goods are non-excludability and non-rivalry in 
consumption. It is therefore possible for one person to consume without reducing 
the amount available for someone else, but impossible to exclude anyone from 
consumption except at prohibitive cost. Given these characteristics it is clear that 
public goods are especially vulnerable to the free-rider problem if supplied by the 
private sector. There simply is no satisfactory demand revelation mechanism. 
Since all consumers receive the benefits of public goods regardless of their ability 
or willingness to pay, no individual has the incentive to reveal the intensity of his 
own preference for the goods in the hope that other individuals will pay for its 
provision and thereby create the opportunity for free-riding. It follows that the 
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provision of public goods must ultimately be determined on the basis of an 
appropriate system of collective decision-making and social choice. The provision 
of pure public goods by the state is generally accepted as inevitable and sound. 
In practice, however, pure public goods are quite uncommon. Instead the market 
economy is characterised by the prevalence of mixed or merit goods which have 
a private good component, but also exhibit public good characteristics. In such 
cases private provision will have to contend with market failure while public 
provision will have to deal with the possible implementation of a subsidy and tax 
policy. The problems relating to merit goods fall outside the ambit of this 
dissertation. However, it should be remembered that merit goods are often 
produced by natural monopolies. This will be dealt with more fully later. 
Thfrdly, externalities are regarded as a major source of market failure and allocative 
inefficiency, which calls for government intervention. An externality arises 
whenever an individual's production or consumption decision directly affects the· 
production or consumption of others in a way other than through market prices. 
It has already been stated that in order to achieve allocative efficiency, marginal 
social costs must equal marginal social benefits, which in turn requires that 
marginal private costs equal marginal social costs and marginal private benefits 
equal marginal social benefits. When these equations are not achieved an external 
diseconomy exists, of which only two forms will be named here. A 
producer-consumer external diseconomy occurs when the actions of a producer 
inflict external costs on consumers for which they are not compensated. A 
producer-producer external diseconomy, on the other hand, occurs when the action 
11 
of a producer imposes an external cost on other producers for which they are not 
compensated (Black and Dollery, 1992:16-17). Private costs often differ from 
social costs because the resource that is being used or abused is not owned by the 
same entity inflicting damage on the resource. Externalities are non-excludable and 
whenever property rights are not well defined, overly costly to enforce or 
nonexistent, there is no efficient market mechanism by which individuals can 
internalise the effects of the externality through private trades. The trading of 
benefits will even be more difficult if the transaction costs are high and if a large 
number of individuals is involved. The nature of the allocative inefficiency resulting 
from an external diseconomy is either an over-production of the goods associated 
therewith, or under-production of other goods. 
In the past, governments addressed this failure by assuming an allocative role and 
using a so-called Pigouvian tax or subsidy aimed at bringing price or marginal social 
benefit into line with marginal social cost. Interventions of this kind, however, 
bring about failures of their own, such as imperfect information concerning the size 
of the externality and the slopes and shapes of the respective supply and demand 
curves. Moreover, the parties involved have incentives to over- or understate the 
extent of externalities in order to attract subsidies or avoid taxes (Black and 
Dollery, 1992: 18). The Coase theorem suggested that had property rights been 
well-defined and enforceable, and transaction costs negligible, market incentives 
would generate a mutually beneficial exchange of property rights thereby 
internalising externalities (Coase, 1960). However, the assumptions of well 
defined property rights and zero transaction costs cannot easily be realised in 
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practice. In essence, externalities constitute a true market failure and a change in 
ownership per se would not necessarily cause an improvement in allocative 
efficiency, since both private and public decision-makers have to deal with the 
same deficiency. 
Fourthly, the alleged market failure of an unequal distribution of income and wealth 
among consumers and producers· provided the breeding-ground for important 
ideological and pragmatic policy considerations behind the creation of public 
enterprises (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989:660). Firstly, it was believed that public 
enterprises would generate large profits that could be used for priority investment 
and redistribution. Secondly, there was a general mistrust of the ability of the 
private sector to serve the public interest and to disperse generated surpluses 
throughout the economy. It was believed that only the government could make the 
"correct" decisions regarding the allocation of scarce resources and that it should 
therefore hold and lead from the commanding heights of the economy (Nellis and 
Kikeri, 1989:660). Thirdly, the power vacuum after decolonisation in politically 
diversified countries caused governments to place a high premium on the control . 
of strategic industries. National security reasons were often put forward as . 
justification for state involvemer:'t in heavy industries (Van de Walle, 1989:602). 
Fourthly, pragmatic considerations gave governments no other option than to rely 
on public enterprises. This was either because there was no local private sector, 
or it was too small or insufficiently developed. Furthermore, local private· 
entrepreneurs had limited access to the sources of capital, or were linked to 
unpopular minorities and foreign powers (Van de Walle, 1989:602). Fifthly, both 
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the ideological and pragmatic reasons coincided with the interests of the state 
elites, who often used the resources generated by public enterprises to create 
employment for followers, managerial positions for loyal supporters, and potential 
rents for their own constituencies (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989:660). 
Fifthly, the failure of the market to be competitive is a major cause of allocative 
inefficiency in the private sector. According to the classical model a perfectly 
competitive market is a prerequisite for economic efficiency. This entails freedom 
of entry and exit in the market; the lack of product and price differentiation; and 
the absence of any individual firm with a large enough market share to influence 
the level of prices. The competitive conditions enforce an output level at which the 
price equals marginal costs. The outcome of the perfectly competitive market in 
theory is that firms do not earn supernormal profits. Furthermore, the Pareto 
conditions are satisfied for the optimal allocation of factor inputs in the production 
of goods and for the optimal allocation of such goods among consumers. The 
cornerstone of this model is the alleged presence of an invisible hand that directs 
the selfish profit maximising drive of individual firms to promote the interests of 
society at large. 
Another feature of the model is that satisfactory performance depends heavily upon 
the market structure. In the light thereof, deficiencies in performance have often 
been attributed to deficiencies in the market structure, and policy remedies used 
by governments have been aimed at altering such market structures (Devine; 
1979:313,314). Since the nineteenth century economists were quick to point out 
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that perfect competition would yield the most efficient use of given resources. It 
has been argued that the distorticms of imperfect competition should be rectified 
through government intervention in the form of either regulation or nationalisation. 
Economists, however, came to believe that perfect competition was not only rarely 
attainable in practice, but has no absolute value and does not guarantee efficiency 
(Griffith, 1976: 156). In the debate on ownership the phenomenon of monopoly is 
particularly important. It derives its importance from the fact that it involves the 
concentration of economic power. Monopoly is essentially the control over 
resources and over the individual preferences of producers and consumers (Brett, 
1988:61). Kuznets ( 1965: 195) described the rationale behind the shift to 
monopoly as "the increasing use of mechanised power, the greater control over 
materials, and the greater articulation of the underlying basic knowledge, which 
made for greater economies of scale, and for an optimum size of industrial plant 
far larger than .that of pre-modern times". This has produced an inevitable 
tendency towards the concentration ·of economic power and the growth of 
monopolies in the private sector. 
According to Brett (1988:62) the growth of monopolies has led to the formation 
of a working class with interests totally different from those of capital. Private 
capital owners were in a position to exercise control, not only over workers and 
consumers, but also over the government, thereby threatening the democratic 
foundation of society. The response of the emerging socialist school at the time 
was to demand the nationalisation of the commanding heights of industry and a 
shift of control to the people who would exercise their control by way of their vote 
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in the democratic political process. 
Two broad categories of monopoly can be distinguished, namely statutory 
monopoly, e.g. in the form of a large multi-sectoral conglomerate, and natural 
monopoly. In the first category, artificial entry barriers are used to protect the 
market shares of incumbent firms from potential newcomers. Generally the 
statutory monopoly refers to the situation where potential competitors are 
prevented from entering the market by legal or administrative restrictions imposed 
by the state or professional bodies. The most common reason for such restrictions 
is the protection of infant industries. 
In the case of the large conglomerate, the entry barrier could also be created by the 
firm itself. The financial power of such a firm enables it to rely on its own reserves 
to finance price setting below profit-maximisation level in order to force newcomers 
out of the market (Black and Dollery, 1992: 10). The multi-sectoral conglomerates 
are characterised by a holding company structure with its subsidiaries spread over 
different sectors of the economy. Although the subsidiary firms do not necessarily 
function as monopolies in their respective sectors, they can exhibit some of the 
characteristics of monopolies (Ramanadham, 1984: 103). The most common 
example is where the inefficiencies of subsidiaries are being protected by 
inter-enterprise cross-subsidisation so that they manage to compete unfairly with 
other firms in spite of their inherent weaknesses (Ramanadham, 1984: 103). 
Before turning to the natural monopoly, it is necessary briefly to refer to the 
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critique of market failure and its identification with allocative inefficiency. 
Toumanoff (1984: 529-533) criticises the neoclassical model in that it fails to 
recognise that market failure is to a large extent the result of excessively high 
transaction costs, and that the concern of neoclassical economists with market 
failure is a misplaced one being largely due to the inability of their model to account 
for such costs. According to Toumanoff (1984:531) transaction costs occur as 
resources are used (a) when market participants attempt to identify and contact 
one another (identification costs), (b) when contracts are negotiated (negotiation 
costs), and (c) when the terms of the contracts are verified and enforced 
(enforcement costs). A theoretical model ignoring these costs must be incomplete 
in that it leads to unexploited mutually beneficial exchanges in existing markets 
because the costs of the exchanges exceed the benefits. In this sense Dahlman 
( 1979: 141-1 62) argues that the so-called market failure of externalities can only 
exist to the extent that transaction costs exceed any benefits from further 
exchange. Demsetz ( 1988(a) :47-57) supports this view by averring that entry 
barriers, giving rise to market power, are not real market failures but rather 
responses to the existence of positive transaction costs. Trademarks, for example, 
tend to reduce certain transaction costs such as identification costs while raising 
an entry barrier. In this sense entry barriers may not be a market failure at all, but 
rather a reaction to the reality of high transaction costs. Toun:ianoff ( 1984: 533) 
argues that the incorporation of transaction costs in the theoretical model will 
effectively render the model consistent with observed behaviour thereby nullifying 
the implication of inefficiency and market failure. 
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According to Toumanoff (1984:533) there is a dynamic interaction between 
transaction costs and alternative institutional environments. He explains that 
market institutions tend to promote exchanges in which identification of trading 
partners is particularly difficult, while regulatory institutions tend to promote 
efficient resource allocation where negotiating costs are especially high. To 
summarise Toumanoff's argument, it cannot be said that certain institutions cause 
market failure, but rather that institutions are adopted to accommodate existing 
transaction costs, which, if duly accounted for in a complete analytical model 
incorporating all relevant variables, will always certify any behaviour as efficient. 
2.2 THE NATURAL MONOPOLY 
For the purpose o.f this dissertation the case of the natural monopoly is particularly 
important. Natural monopolies are related to industries characterised by such large 
capital outlays and economies of scale that only one firm can operate effectively 
in the market. Especially in the case of developing countries with limited markets, 
the demand for natural-monopoly 9utput is normally not large enough to permit 
these firms to follow a policy of marginal-cost pricing and break even at the same 
time. The heavy overhead capital of these firms causes their unit costs to decline 
rather gradually as production expands (Truu, 1988:256). The position of 
pioneering firms regarding potential competition is usually entrenched by their 
superior experience, technological expertise and capital lay-out in the industry 
concerned. 
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The natural monopoly is characterised by long-run average cost of production (AC) 
declining as output increases, as indicated in Figure 1 . The marginal cost (MC) 
curve will lie below the AC curve over the entire output range. The profit 
maximising producer in a competitive market sets market price equal to marginal 
costs (i.e .. P =MC). Th,e problem with this Pareto-efficient solution is that it results 
in a loss for the natural monopoly (indicated by PcP'fe in figure 1), because of the 
positions of its MC and AC curves (AC > Average Revenue). The monopoly will 
rather reduce output to the point where its marginal cost equals marginal revenue 
(at Om) and raise price above marginal cost (at Pm). As a result the producer will 
extract a monopoly rent with a concomitant deadweight loss as consumers' surplus 
is reduced. In this way resources are being misallocated and a loss is inflicted on 
society. 
P' -----------------------
P" -- -·---- --------- - --- -- - --- ----- - --
0 
Figure 1 : Standard Natural Monopoly Diagram 
AC 
a a s c 
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If the Pareto-efficient level of output is to be produced at marginal cost price, then 
either (i) it must be produced and supplied by the public sector (nationalisation); or 
(ii) the private sector will require a subsidy from the government to make it feasible 
to operate at that level (regulation). In both these cases the government would be 
responsible for financing the loss from general taxation. Many public monopolies 
were created or nationalised throughout the world in the belief that even if 
allowance is made for the distort!onary effect of the required tax cum subsidy mix, 
marginal cost pricing is likely to engender a higher level of allocative efficiency than 
private monopolies. 
The implications of the monopoly for the two-sector model could also be illustrated. 
in Figure 2 by the difference between the slope of the Production Possibility Curve 
·(TT) and the commodity price line (P'P'). In this instance Y is assumed to be the 
monopolist and X the perfectly competitive industry. The difference in the slopes 
is accounted for· by the fact that the output level of good X is increased at the 
expense of good Y. The monopoly causes a degree of allocative inefficiency in 
that at ·point M, too little of good Y is produced relative to good X. An 
improvement in allocative efficiency could be brought about by reallocating 
resources in order to increase the output of good Y and shift the economy towards 








Neoclassical economic theory, according to Nellis and Kikeri (1989:663), 
associates efficiency outcomes with market structures and specifically with 
competition levels. It is believed that ownership plays only a secondary role in 
influencing the level of allocative efficiency (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988:20; 
Hemming and Mansoor, 1988:33; Nellis and Kikeri, 1989:663; Goodman and 
Loveman, 1991 :28). The acceptance of such a theory, however, would be 
tantamount to surrender to allocative inefficiency in the case of the natural 
monopoly, where there is little, if any, scope for improved competition within the 
industry. The characteristics of the natural monopoly make it a suitable candidate 
for analysing the efficiency effects of a change in ownership. Should the 
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competitive firm or statutory monopoly be used in such an analysis, the danger 
exists that a change in pwnership could alter the market structure in such a way 
that it would be difficult to isolate the effects of a changed ownership structure on 
efficiency levels from the possible concomitant efficiency effects brought about 
either by the improvement of competition or the contraction of the market. If, as 
in the case of the natural monopoly, very little scope exists for a variation in the 
market structure, the question to be considered is whether a change in ownership 
would improve allocative or productive efficiency in the economy, given the market 
structure in which the firm operates. In this dissertation it will be argued that 
factors inherent to public and private ownership do have a strong influence on 
efficiency levels in the economy. 
2.3 TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS IN RESPECT OF THE NATURAL MONOPOLY 
Market failure in the form of a lack of competition and the presence of natural 
monopolies in particular, has played an important role in shaping government 
policies. Control over natural monopolies was always regarded by governments as 
extremely important, because it often conferred the owners unchecked economic 
power over important industries in the economy. Especially in deveioping countries 
the core of the strategic public utilities usually consists of natural monopolies that 
provide essential services without being checked by the discipline of the 
competitive market. Examples of this type of industry are public utilities providing 
water, gas, electricity, roads, rail transport and postal services. 
J 
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In developing countries the satisfaction of basic needs is considered an important 
function of government. Public utilities deal with bread and butter issues in the 
economy and public attention is often focused intensely on the price, output and 
quality produced. Another important factor is the intensifying of the weights 
attached to the social content of their operations, such as the levels of 
unemployment, prices and regional disparities (Ramanadham, 1984: 110). It is 
therefore crucial for the government that these natural monopolies should be 
managed effectively in accordance with the needs of the public at large and aimed 
at promoting the public interest instead of sectional private interests. The 
importance of the natural monopoly to society and the fear that the benefits of 
monopoly pricing could be captured by sectional private interests, paved the way 
for government to play a strong allocative role. 
Traditionally three lines of action have been taken by governments in order to 
address the market failure of inadequate competition, namely promoting 
competition, regulating private monopolies and nationalising important industries. 
Firstly, competition policies, although only feasible in the case of artificial or 
statutory monopolies, were aimed at promoting counter-balancing forces in the 
market that could keep individual participants in check. Competition policies have 
been widely adopted by governments, but with mixed successes. Developed 
countries implemented policies against restraint of trade, monopolisation and 
interference with competition (eg formation of mergers) with limited success 
(Mansfield, 1968: 14). In developing countries the creation of a competitive 
environment involves a long term structural change within the market, which 
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cannot be effected overnight. Thus, existing monopolies could not easily be 
broken down into smaller units without sacrificing technical efficiency and 
economies of scale. The line of action taken by government mainly entailed 
deregulation or the removal of the barriers to entry (eg licences, taxes and 
standards) as well as the promotion of the small enterprise (Black and Dollery, 
1992: 11, 12). This remedy however, is inadequate when applied to the natural 
monopoly. 
Milton Friedman (1962:28, 128, 129) rejected the regulation of the private monopoly 
and suggested a natural shift towards competition brought about by new market 
opportunities. He held the opinion that the conditions in society may rapidly 
change so as to introduce new opportunities for competition within a n_atural 
monopolistic market and that the public monopoly and regulated private monopoly 
may be less responsive to and more entrenched against such changes than the 
unregulated private ·monopoly which he viewed as the "lesser evil". He did 
however, admit that if an essential utility or commodity is at stake and the 
monopoly power is sizable, then even the short-term effects of a private 
unregulated monopoly may be intolerable and contrary to the public interest 
. . 
(Friedman, 1962:28). The choice should therefore not be made in isolation from 
the factual circumstances .. 
The second line of action has been to accept the inevitable prevalence of imperfect 
competition, and to emphasise the allocative role of the state as regulator in 
addressing the allocative inefficiency of natural monopolies. If the Pareto-efficient 
... 
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level of output (Qc in Figure 1) is to be produced at a marginal cost price (Pc in 
Figure 1), then the government could instruct the private sector to charge the 
marginal cost price and undertake the responsibility of subsidising the private 
industry to cover its losses. The subsidy to the private firm (e~ual to Pc-P' in Figure 
1 ), will have to be financed by government from general taxation. Since taxes 
influence relative prices, it will introduce new distortions elsewhere in the 
economy, which should be weighed up against the inefficiencies that the 
government intervention were supposed to reduce. 
It is therefore difficult to determine the net effect of such a marginal cost pricing 
policy on allocative efficiency. The theory of the second-best, as generally applied 
by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956: 11-32), deals with circumstances where price does 
not reflect marginal cost in all markets, and maintains that efficiency requires the 
percentage deviation of price from marginal cost to be the same in all industries. 
The implication is that if imperfect competition exists in one industry only, it might 
be inefficient in an allocative sense if the first-best Paretian condition, i.e. price 
equals marginal cost, is implemented in the other competitive industries. As most 
economies have to deal with some or other restriction, the theory of the 
second-best will oppose any attempt to realise first-best Paretian conditions on a 
partial basis (Tisdell, 1972:299-300). With reference to our standard natural 
monopoly as indicated by Figure 1, the second-best theory will resist regulatory 
endeavours aimed at achieving a competitive equilibrium at point e. It will instead 
prefer the regulated monopoly to operate at a point such as s, with output at Os 
and price at P", while reducing both the subsidy to the monopoly and the degree 
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of tax distortion elsewhere in the economy. In this way it is suggested that the 
economy could be fine-tuned so that price could exceed marginal cost by the same 
proportion. throughout the economy in order to achieve a second-best solution. 
The· process of regulation involves mechanisms by which governments could gain 
· control over private monopolies. In the absence of competition, systems of 
licensing and the supervision by regulatory agencies have been used by 
governments to protect the public interest in the case of essential utilities supplied 
by the private sector. These agencies determined the size of the subsidies and 
specifically guarded against possible abuse of monopoly power by private interests 
in respect of pricing, output, quality of service·and the provision of uneconomical 
but socially essential services and facilities {Moore, 1992: 121). With regard to 
pricing, formulas based on the retail price iridex and adapted to take account of all 
the related factors have been used as a market substitute {Moore, 1992: 121). 
With' regard to output and quality, the licences set clear performance targets that 
should be met as well as specific requirements relating to the maintainability of 
uneconomical, yet indispensable services {Moore, 1992:121). 
The regulation of the private monopoly aimed at enforcing an allocatively efficient 
price-output mix, proved to be a complex if not impossible task. The efficiency of 
this system depends heavily on the quality of the information revealed by the 
regulated firm. The problem is that the information on which the regulation is 
based, is provided by the very victim qt the regulatory process, namely the 
regulated private firm. Its management will be tempted to misrepresent the facts 
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in order to protect their monopoly rent and bargain more favourable conditions. 
According to Yarrow (1989:55) regulatory agencies not only have to deal with 
monopoly in the supply of the product or service, but also with monopoly in the 
supply of information. Regulation based on the assumption of perfect information, 
offers a straightforward remedy to allocative inefficiency. 
It is, however, characteristic of monopolies to accord considerable power to 
managers in the control of information flows to regulators and shareholders alike 
(Yarrow, 1989:55). A further problem facing regulating agencies is that past 
performance of the monopoly, as a basis for regulatory decision-making, could be 
manipulated by private managers by inflating their costs or biasing investment 
programmes so as to induce more favourable allowances regarding prices and 
output levels (Yarrow, 1989:55). If management, on the other hand, chooses sunk 
investment expenditure to reduce costs as well as prices, it runs the risk that the 
government may decide to enforce these low prices without allowing the firm to 
recover its sunk costs (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991: 114). Information on consumer 
preferences and the firm's cost conditions will be difficult to obtain in a 
monopolised market (Yarrow, 1989:60). One of the most important advantages 
of improved competition is the concomitant extension of information available to 
regulators resulting in more effective policies aimed at enforcing the optimal output 
level of the firm and curbing allocative inefficiency. 
An important development in the field of regulation has been to make the process 
of application for and granting of licences subject to competition. Competitive 
27 
tendering for the right to serve the market at the lowest price to the consumer for 
a fixed or agreed quality of service has been suggested in this regard (Veljanovski, 
1989:49). It involves the auction of monopoly rights and is based upon 
competition at the licensing stage to eliminate monopoly prices arid practices. A 
strong rivalry between the applicants ensures that monopoly rents are passed on 
to the consumers in the form of lower prices and higher output. Demsetz 
(1968:55-65) argued that if there was a large number of bidders and very little 
collusion among them, the winning bid could offer a price that is very close to 
per-unit production costs. The system relies on the self-interest of the applicants 
to define the terms of the franchise and reveal the information necessary to choose 
the best applicant (Veljanovski, 1989:49). It also reduces the role of a regulatory 
agency as well as the possibility of additional distortions. One drawback of this 
system, especially in respect of natural monopolies, is that the franchise has to be 
awarded for a considerable time.period because of the large capital investment that 
has to be made. In the case of re-tendering, the incumbent firm will be in a 
position to offer more favourable terms than newcomers, because of the existence 
of sunk costs (Veljanovski, 1989:50). The existing firm can therefore entrench its 
stronghold on the industry and regain its monopoly power over time. This would 
largely frustrate the spirit and aim of the franchise-model. 
The above-mentioned problem areas have frustrated governments in their attempts 
swiftly to correct the imbalances caused by the lack of competition. However, the 
intricacies surrounding the regulation of private monopolies fall outside the ambit 
of this dissertation and the above explanation will suffice. The general conclusion 
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to be drawn is that regulation was inefficient due to the fact that government lacks 
effective control over private enterprises. 
The third line of action ventured by governments was to gain full control over the 
monopoly by taking over its ownership and to manage it in the public interest. 
Public ownership was a way by which governments endeavoured to gain direct de 
facto control over important industries. Public monopolies have been created or 
private monopolies nationalised for a variety of reasons. In developing countries 
the reasons were either pragmatic, in the sense that the private sector did not have 
adequate finances for the required capital outlay, or ideological, in the sense that 
public utilities provided the government with a strategic measure of control over 
"-
the economy (Van de Walle, 1989:602). In the more developed economies the 
belief has been that even if allowance is made for the distortionary effect of 
financing losses, the policy of marginal cost pricing in public monopolies is likely 
to engender a higher level of allocative efficiency than in the case of regulated 
private monopolies, as discussed earlier. 
With reference to Figure 3, where sector Y is the natural monopoly and sector X 
perfectly competitive, it is shown how the position of the unregulated monopoly 
(at point M) changes after nationalisation and the application of marginal cost 
pricing. The shift to P indicates that, even though a greater quantity of Y is 
supplied at a lower cost, the additional cost of taxation causes point P to lie below 
the production possibility curve (TT). Whether the change in ownership will in fact 
mean an improvement in the level of social welfare, will depend on whether the 
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It was believed that by nationalising private enterprises and by acting as owner in 
stead of regulator, the government could more easily ensure that the desired output 
is produced at the required price. The problems associated with ineffective 
regulation persuaded governments to strengthen their allocative control by taking 
over the responsibility of ownership and management. This policy shift, which was 
\ 
very popular in western economies during the post-war period, opened the door for 
the replacement of market failure with public failure, and it is to this issue that we · 
now turn. 
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CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC FAILURE AND FALL OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: 
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND ALLOCATIVE INEFFICIENCY 
In this chapter, we will explain how an important feature of public ownership, 
namely the separation of ownership by citizens and control by politicians and 
bureaucrats, contributed to its own downfall by creating the breeding ground for 
public failures. This lack of control by owners has given rise to the use of the 
public enterprise by politicians and bureaucrats as a political instrument, and has 
resulted in an oversupply of relatively unpopular public goods and, thus, allocative 
inefficiency. Therefore, instead of redressing the problem of insufficient output 
under the private monopoly scenario, an overkill has taken place towards the 
opposite extreme of allocative inefficiency. 
3.1 SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The phenomenon of the separation of ownership and control is present in both the 
public and private sectors of the modern economy. This feature provides the 
essential background for a comparative analysis of the publicly and privately owned 
modern firm. The improvement of allocative efficiency is an important step in the 
maximisation of social welfare. As discussed above, market failures provided the 
logical basis for public ownership. In the absence of an effective market 
mechanism, the public sector is left to its own devices to aim its decision-making 
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at improved allocative efficiency. Because social welfare is at stake, the society 
at large bears the risk of the outcome of such policy decisions. It therefore follows 
that a mechanism should be available whereby the members of society have a say 
in the allocative decision-making process. Under perfect circumstances, the 
political process of representative democracy provides such a mechanism. 
The public firm in a.representative democracy is "owned" by the country's citizens 
and "managed" on their behalf by politicians as their chosen representatives. 
Practical considerations require politicians to delegate their managing power to their 
appointees, i.e. bureaucrats, who undertake the day to day management of the 
public firm.· Each public· firm is characterised by a hierarchy of power and a 
network of rank where officials report to bosses, and these bosses in turn receive 
instructions from their superiors. Top officials are accountable to politicians who 
form the government or the central administration of the country. On their part, 
governing politicians are responsible to the broad ·community, as the true owners 
of public goods, for ensuring allocative efficiency in the public sector. The 
country's citizens are indeed the "shareholders" of the public firm and use the 
ballot system to appoint and replace politicians as its directors to ensure that 
· allocative policies within the public sector are in line with the public interest. 
Governing politicians not only derive their power from the people, but also act as 
their representatives in the same way directors of managerial firms are appointed 
by and represent the shareholders. Under public ownership, therefore, the firm is 
run by public managers (bureaucrats) on behalf public directors (politicians) who 
exercise control in their capacity as the agents of the owners, i:e. the people. 
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The people can use their right to vote via the political process to put pressure on 
politicians to direct public firms in such a way that the maximisation of social 
welfare is ensured. The management of public firms could therefore be controlled, 
albeit indirectly, by the -citizenry, in that they have the collective means to persuade 
politicians to make the correct decisions regarding output and price. Voters could 
also pressure politicians either to replace inefficient managers and bureaucrats, or 
to be replaced themselves. In practice, however, public failure has prevented 
voters, as the real owners of public firms, from effectively controlling or 
supervising the allocative decision-making of politicians and public managers, thus 
resulting in a relative welfare loss. 
At the root of public failure lies the failure of the political process in representative 
democracies to provide a reliable and effective mechanism by which political 
behaviour could be monitored. The political process is handicapped by a complex 
monitoring hierarchy, involving a two-tier delegation process; first from the 
members of society (as principals) to politicians; and second from politicians to 
public managers (Yarrow, 1989:53). Regarding society's control over politicians, 
the weakness lies with the poor interaction between politicians and voters, which 
takes place through a highly imperfect political market place that is not especially 
designed for monitoring specific allocative decisions. As a monitoring device, the 
political system in representative democracies has proved to be defective in more 
than one respect. Firstly, the members of society could only exercise their property 
rights through a collective political process which do not recognise any one 
individual's ownership of these firms (Veljanovski, 1989:36). The ownership share 
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of an inc;iividual member of society in a specific public firm is also too small to 
produce a large enough incentive for monitoring allocative decision-making. Such 
dispersal of ownership renders ineffective any control by owners over managerial 
behaviour. Secondly, voters are ignorant of much of what politicians stand for, 
since they do not have sufficient incentives to acquire this information (Black and 
Dollery, 1992:21 ). Thirdly, politic.ians are elected on the basis of a complex 
package of policies and therefore do not have to please the majority on each 
separate policy issue. It may be possible for a politician to draw the vote of a 
citizen who disagrees with 49 percent of his policies. Furthermore, a voter who 
} 
disagrees totally with the economic or managerial policies of a political candidate, 
may still vote for such candidate, because of his/her views on another important 
issue such as defence or public health. This paves the way for implicit logrolling 
favouring special interest legislation as well as for arbitrary political interv'ention 
aimed .at gaining sectional support (Black and Dollery, 1992:21 ). Fourthly, 
politicians have large incentives to conceal information that may be detrimental to 
their political wellbeing. Bureaucrats may also team up with politicians to publicise 
only information which is politically acceptable and thereby secure their own 
future careers. On the other hand, they may decide that merely to articulat.e 
certain problem areas and to propose possible solutions, will draw enough political 
acclaim, without assuming responsibility of implementing it (Wolf, 1979:11 5). 
Fifthly, because of practical and financial reasons, elections cannot be held 
annually. Society is forced to bear with inefficient politicians for a period of four 
or five years before they could replace them via the ballot box. 
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With regard to society's control over public managers or bureaucrats, it is evident 
that ordinary citizens have little access to information on allocative decision-making 
within the public firm other than those publicised by politicians and senior officials 
in the manner discussed above. Voters have to approach politicians with their 
queries, who not only have a tendency to protect their appointees and conceal the 
bad news, but also have difficulties in obtaining the correct information from public 
managers. This is so because it is usually very difficult to measure the output and 
quality of public or semi-public goods in the absence of market structures (Wolf, 
1979: 113-114). It is for example very difficult to compare the quality of 
education, welfare programmes and environmental regulation with that of previous 
years. Wolf (1979: 114) submits that monitoring quality requires precise, 
representative and regularised feedback which is hard to realise for non-market 
output. 
It can therefore be concluded that the members of society, as owners of public 
firms, have lost effective control over the management thereof. The severance of 
the control function from the ownership function, left open the door for politicians 
and managers to run public firms so as to further their personal objectives, rather 
than those of the broader society. 
3.2 THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 
The separation of ownership and control creates the freedom for politicians to use 
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public firms as political instruments, aimed at furthering their personal political 
aspirations at the expense of allocative efficiency. They regard the public firm as 
a useful political instrument by which they could control important economic 
variables, protect politically sensitive industries, serve powerful interest groups ·and 
so doing promote their personal political careers. This politicisation of the public 
sector has contributed to the oversupply of relatively unpopular public goods by 
over-sized public firms thus rendering the public sector inefficient in the allocative . 
sense. Although the creation of public firms improved the ability of the state to 
influence the allocative decision-making in the economy, it also brought commercial 
decision-making within the complexity of the political arena. This created the 
possibility of a public failure, i.e. public over-supply, especially in cases where the 
political system is such that the pursuit of personal political agendas of politicians 
, 
is not constrained and checked by the countervailing powers of owners {Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1991:113-114). 
The politicisation of the public sector involves the departure from conventional 
economic decision-making in favour of political decision-making. Politicians have 
the tendency to ignore conventional economic rules relating to allocative efficiency, 
for exam.pie the rule that marginal cost and price should be equated, if they 
consider it politically convenient to do so {Van de Walle, 1989:602-603). Instead 
they apply the vague criterion of political expediency to allocative decision-making. 
In this way they would be expected to support those policies exhibiting clear 
·vote-maximising potential and strongly resist those that may have unpopular 
side-effects. Furthermore politicians would be inclined to make unrealistic 
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pre-election promises and then find it difficult to fulfil the exaggerated expectations 
that they created. 
The problem is that politicians operate in a political market place where there aim 
is to accumulate support. It follows that, if politicians are allowed to exert strong 
influence on the economic market place via the public sector, the allocative 
decision-making process will be politicised. Depending on the degree of 
politicisation, public firms will be pressured by politicians to produce more goods 
at lower prices, for it is usually the most popular action to take. In this way a 
culture of allocative inefficiency is created. 
Vote-maximising behaviour of politicians in a quest to satisfy personal political 
objectives forms the backbone of the politicisation process and contributes greatly 
to public failure and specifically to the oversupply of public goods. In 
representative democracies, vote-maximising behaviour entails activities of 
politicians aimed at securing and retaining political office. Politicians first and 
foremost strive to maximise their personal political popularity or that of the party 
they belong to. It might be argued that politicians would gain enough political 
patronage by merely serving the interests of society at large, for it is the members 
of society who will eventually decide whether or not to re-elect incumbent 
politicians. However, in the previous chapter it was indicated that because of the 
separation of ownership and control in the public sector, members of society or 
owners of public firms are not in a position effectively to control or evaluate the 
performance of politicians. It will therefore be in the interest of politicians to 
, 
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promote popular and conspicuous policies while concealing or avoiding the 
unpopular ones. Should politicians be allowed to intervene in the allocative 
decision-making process of public firms, such intervention will necessarily be 
governed by the underlying objectives of vote-maximisation. Such behaviour 
translates into public failure, because of the divergence between the personal 
political objectives of politicians. and the social objectives of society as a whole. 
The first question to be answered is why politicians would aim their 
vote-maximising behaviour at the public sector rather than the private sector. At 
the outset it must be borne in mind that historically public enterprises have been 
very popular institutions among voters,. simply because it had pioneered many 
developing economies into essential fields where the private sector was absent. 
The problem was that the private firms in many less developed countries simply 
could not afford the initial capital and running costs of producing certain basic 
public goods. The provision of basic public services and goods to the broad 
community often entailed the lowering of prices below average costs in order to 
raise output to socially acceptable levels. Public firms were first established in 
developing countries mainly because of the scarcity of private capital to finance the 
large capital expenses required to produce certain basic utilities and essential 
goods. This was especially the case with natural monopolies where initial capital 
outlays were large and a large output was necessary to ensure profitability. In the 
words of La bra ( 1 980:40) the public firm was "seeking to provide employment 
and income to stimulate demand and, through· it, public and private investment in 
a politically stable and progressive atmosphere based on attention to the needs of 
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the majority of citizens". The popularity of the public firm, based on socially 
acceptable objectives, opened up the opportunity for politicians to involve 
themselves in managerial decisions-making with the support of the broad 
community. 
Not only was the public firm a popular "voter friendly" institution, but it also 
proved to be a versatile instrument by which politicians could directly influence a 
variety of economic variables. The public enterprise offered a strategic political and 
social avenue for the speedy reactivation of the economy through the direct 
stimulus of employment, an increase in the overall supply of goods in the economy, 
and an improvement of income distribution. Many countries strongly relied on the 
public enterprise as the backbone of their economic policies and the instrument by 
which to influence critical elements like employment, provision of foodstuffs and 
foreign exchange (Labra, 1980:39). 
It must be borne in mind that public managers were essentially government officials 
obliged to obey the instructions of government, irrespective of whether they were 
politically inspired or economically unsound. With regard to private firms, 
politicians do have the power to intervene in its managerial decision-making 
process by enforcing "politically correct" policies via the legislative process, but 
with less ease and at greater costs than in the case of public enterprises (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1991: 114). The legislative process, however, involves a slow, 
cumbrous and public process, to the extent that the whole purpose of the 
intervention could be undermined. To sum up, the fact that public enterprises were 
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popular and versatile institutions that could be controlled and manipulated by 
self-interested politicians, created a fertile breeding ground for vote-maximising 
behaviour and public failure. 
Four types of vote-maximising behaviour will now be discussed: firstly the artificial 
political manipulation of popular economic indicators; secondly, satisfying the 
demands of strong lobbying groups; thirdly, expanding the size of public firms; and 
fourthly, creating exaggerated expectations among voters. 
Firstly, politicians consider it in the interest of their own political careers to ensure 
that popular economic indicators reflect a favourable picture in order to create the 
impression that the economy as a whole is in good shape. Ordinary citizens lack 
the economic expertise and the specialised information to make an educated 
judgment on how the economy is performing at any point in time. As a result, they 
often rely on popular, understandable economic indicators such as inflation, 
unemployment, wage increases and the availability of basic goods in order to asses 
the well-being of society and the success of economic policies at a given time. By 
artificially influencing these popular variables, politicians can "window dress" the 
economy in order to "buy" political support, even though it might be at the 
expense of long-run allocative efficiency. The easiest and quickest way for 
politicians to influence particular economic variables, is yia the public sector where 
they have easier access and control to adjust prices, wages, investment and 
output. Such political intervention in economic decision-making pursuant to hidden 
vote-maximising agendas, can be expected to be arbitrary in nature. 
' 
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Politicians usually defend such interference by claiming that it serves the public 
interest by correcting existing market failures. More often, however, such 
government intervention is based on political expediency and is usually arbitrary 
from an economic perspective. The reason for this is that political intervention is 
used for a variety of political aims. These aims include buying electoral support in 
pre-election times, pleasing certain high profile interest groups, meeting the 
expectations of loyalists, satisfying the claims and answering the criticisms of the 
opposition. More specifically, political agendas entail different elements such as 
redistribution to favoured interest groups, high employment levels in politically 
sensitive sectors and assistance to underprivileged groups or regions (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1991: 113). These goals are usually achieved by expanding supply and 
restricting prices of public goods, resulting in allocative inefficiency in the form of 
an oversupply of public goods. Interventionist policies are very rarely embodied in 
a detailed long-term economic and socio-political plan. They are rather designed 
in arbitrary fashion to achieve short-sighted covert political goals which do not 
necessarily enhance the public interest. Political popularity is a very sensitive 
variable and subject to a wide variety of pressure groups in society. In order to 
please everyone, governments will often persuade public firm man~gement to 
pursue a variety of policy objectives. The nature of the government's intervention 
and the emphasis placed on each individual objective will vary with the ebb and 
flow of the political tides. Although individual policies improve allocative efficiency 
in that it could bring about a more equitable distribution of income, the arbitrary 
nature of government intervention in public enterprises severely hampers the 
systematic pursuit of allocative efficiency. 
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Secondly, politicians focus on meeting the demands of public employees and 
consumers of public goods, both being strong political lobbying groups. The 
political power of public employees is due to the strong solidarity among the 
employees of public.firms who all work for the same employer, i.e. the state, with 
·seemingly unlimited resources. The consumers of public goods usually make up 
a large percentage of the total voting power in the country. Especially in 
developing countries where bas'ic goods are provided by the publ)c sector, nearly 
all citizens are consumers of these goods and regard them as basic necessities. 
Politicians will therefore go a long way in trying to meet their politically sensitive 
demands and accommodate their needs. In this way, the public sector offers a 
speedy mechanism to politicians by which they can satisfy and give ·relief to 
important political pressure groups during crucial political periods. The timing of 
such relief policies will also follow the rules of political expediency. However, such 
political intervention is often distortive in an economic sense, due to the 
discrepancy between political and economic time frames. Political tim·e frames 
which are governed by political opportunism, are usua·lly incompatible with the 
longer time cycles that business needs (Moore, 1992: 117). Disregard by 
politicians of ignoring commercially viable time frames and the enterprise's need 
to remain competitive, can inflict permanent damage to an industry if they try to 
fulfil election promises by artificially creating more jobs for unemployed voters or 
by manipulating prices to favour dissatisfied consumers (Moore, 1992: 117). 
Intervention of this kind is aimed at gaining short-term political patronage during 
critical stages in the careers of incumbent politicians, for example when important 
bills are to be approved by Parliament or during the run-up to elections. An 
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example would be the tendency of the government to lower the price of petrol 
during the pre-election campaign, knowing that it is a popular short term policy, 
even though it could have a long term detrimental effect on fiscal policy and 
allocative efficiency. Another example would be the political timing of adjustments 
to civil servants' salaries without taking into consideration productivity changes. 
In the third place the degree of control exercised by politicians over important 
variables in the economy depends on the size of the public sector under their 
control. A relatively large public sector renders more direct control to politicians 
over the economy as a whole. Bearing in mind that politicians are inclined to 
accumulate economic power and control, they would want to promote the growth 
of the public sector by increasing the number of public employees. The expansion 
of public employment could be used by politicians as a vote-maximising instrument. 
This policy could, for instance, be pursued under the pretext of a popular policy 
measure such as curbing unemployment. A larger civil employment also increases 
the number of potential voters from which political support could be bought 
through direct measures such as an increase in wages or fringe benefits. In similar 
vein, politicians will be very cautious to streamline over-staffed public enterprises, 
because of the potential loss of popularity they could suffer from a public outcry 
against forced redundancies. However, the artificial expansion of public 
employment for political reasons will result in allocative inefficiency, in the sense 
of an over-supply of public goods by over-sized public firms. 
In the fourth place, politicians are inclined to create unrealistic expectations among 
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consumers and public employees. Consumers have come to expect public 
enterprises to maintain high levels of output at "fair" (low) prices and also to 
continue providing unprofitable goods and services, while workers have come to 
believe that wages should be paid regardless of productivity and that they have the 
right to jobs regardless of efficiency (Pryke, 1981 :262-265). Such unrealistic 
expectations often originate from politicians themselves, who are inclined to make 
many promises during election campaigns without taking into account that they will 
have to live up to them when they are elected. An example of this is the false 
expectations created by the political parties before the first democratic elections 
in South Africa to the effect that houses will be provided for all the homeless if 
they were to win. High expectations intensify demand and put pressure on the 
public sector to raise its output beyond efficient levels. 
Many examples of politically induced allocative inefficiency have been recorded. 
Only a few will be discussed here to illustrate how political intervention could lead 
to the oversupply of public goods. In 1973 when the British Gas Corporation 
bowed to political pressure and artificially maintained low domestic prices in order 
to absorb the OPEC oil shocks, this policy endangered the competitive position of 
electricity utilities, which burned coal (Moore, 1992: 117). From this flowed excess 
capacity in the electricity industry and surplus production in the coal industry, 
together with shortages in gas production, resulting in the refusal of important 
industrial business opportunities favouring domestic consumers. Consumers, who 
eventually switched to gas, were hard hit by the inevitable rise in gas prices to 
catch up with the market (Moore, 1992: 117). 
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Grassini ( 1981 :70-82) studied the political constraints in Italian public enterprises 
during the 1970's and identified four political goals which politicians expected their 
public managers to pursue: creating new jobs and avoiding dismissals; improving 
working conditions; employment for political patronage; and financing political 
campaigns. Managerial performance is often judged on these political 
considerations instead of commercial viability. He remarks that in this way many 
public enterprises continued to make losses for years without efficiency being 
questioned, as long as it could be attributed to the cost of adhering to social 
objectives. Another example, according to Moore ( 1992: 117), is that politicians 
may overrule commercial judgments by building a new factory in a politically 
sensitive area where unemployment is rife, or in the same vein refusing to close 
uneconomical plants. In this way, by placing greater emphasis on the concern for 
jobs than on efficiency, even greater job losses may occur in the long run. 
Richard Pryke ( 1981 :262-265) furthermore maintained that while government 
policy during the 1960's was that public enterprises should operate at minimum 
costs, earn reasonable profits and behave commercially, nationalised industries in 
the 1970's were expected by their governments to pursue a variety of vague, 
contradictory and diverse objectives in order to please different political pressure 
groups. In this way they were required simultaneously to expand their staff to 
please trade unions, hold prices down to satisfy consumers and maximise profits 
to appease the Treasury. Public enterprises were being seen as instruments of 
economic and social policy and not as commercially disciplined undertakings 
(Pryke, 1981 :262-265). This conflict in objectives causes confusion in 
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management which is not conducive to allocative efficiency. 
In the sixties the UK government did try to establish some consistency in its 
conduct of political intervention by setting financial targets and laying down 
economic guidelines. The Prices and Incomes Board (PIB) were convened to ensure 
that the guidelines are met. But the PIB was dismantled in 1971 and the financial 
targets rendered meaningless by mounting inflation and heavy subsidies (Baumol, 
1980:227). The ad hoc intervention in the form of subsidisation caused an 
oversupply of public goods and had a damaging effect on the allocative efficiency 
in the public sector. This is emphasised by the fact that the granting of a 
permanent subsidy to British Rail was followed by a dramatic reduction in 
productivity growth together with a vigorous recruitment drive which led to an 
increase of 8000 employees between the end of 1973 and .March 1975 (Baumol, 
1980:227). According to Nellis and Kikeri (1989:663), governments in developing 
countries cannot resist the temptation to interfere, no matter how good their stated 
intentions are. Even though they have committed themselves to non-interference 
with stated policy, governments tend to resort to public enterprises in times pf 
crisis in order to accomplish instant economic and socio-political results. When the 
government finds itself in a desperate situation it will be tempted to "bribe" the 
electorate by increasing the output of public goods and thereby providing 
short-term relief to hard-hit communities as well as short-term political survival for 
the incumbent government. 
The conclusion to be arrived at is that politicians are vote-maximisers by nature and 
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tend to aim their vote-maximising behaviour at public enterprises in a continuing 
effort to gain economic control and accumulate political support. It seems as if 
such political intervention in the commercial decision-making of the public 
enterprise is an inherent characteristic of public ownership. This vote-maximising 
intervention is usually focused on influencing popular economic indicators, on 
satisfying the needs of public employees and consumers of public goods, on 
expanding the size of public employment and on trying to meet the unrealistic 
expectations of voters. In doing this, however, the long term interest of the 
economy and the public in general are being sacrificed for the short term personal 
interests of politicians. The maximisation of social welfare is also replaced by the 
maximisation of the personal political wellbeing as the hidden agenda for the public 
enterprise. Although politicians will conceal such vote-maximising objectives under 
the mask of some popular socio-economic aim, political behaviour of this kind 
usually amounts to arbitrary intervention on an ad hoc basis according to vague, 
contradictory policies. The result is an oversupply of public goods and allocative 
inefficiency. 
Public failure, i.e. the oversupply of public goods, can now be illustrated by Figure 
4, depicting the Production Possibility Curve (TT) with product Y as the monopoly 
good. Point C is the competitive output mix where allocative efficiency is 
achieved. Point M is the monopoly position reflecting a lower output and higher 
price of Y than is allocatively efficient. Public ownership of the natural monopoly 
is aimed at redressing this misallocation by setting price equal to marginal cost and 
increasing the output of Yup to the competitive position C. The presence of public 
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failure caused by vote-maximising behaviour of politicians, however, results in an 
over-supply of Y, moving the economy to an inefficient position such as P. Given 
the tax-induced distortions accompanying the subsidisation of public firms, the 
equilibrium will lie inside the TT curve, e.g. at point P'. In order to make a 
comparison between private and public ownership, the allocative inefficiency 
brought about by market failure (at point Ml should be compared with that of the 
public. failure (at point P'). Naturally the answer will depend on the degree of 







Insufficient democratic control over politicians renders them the freedom to use the 
public enterprise as a political, vote-maximising instrument in their personal 
interest. In this way politicians intervene in the allocative decision-making process 
on the basis of political expediency instead of economic viability. Such political 
behaviour leads to public failure in the form of an oversupply of public goods and 
therefore allocative inefficiency. 
CHAPTER 4: PRIVATE RECOVERY AND RISE OF THE MODERN 
MANAGERIAL FIRM: 
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 
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In this chapter it will be shown that even though the separation of ownership 
(shareholders) and control (professional managers) is also prevalent in the modern 
managerial private firm, its effect is to move the private modern monopoly closer 
to the ideal position of allocative efficiency. It is ironic that the same factor which 
led to the fall of the public enterprise, also assisted the rise of the private 
managerial firm. 
4.1 SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN THE MANAGERIAL FIRM 
In this analysis the managerial firm of Monsen and Downs (1972:348-351) will be 
taken as a model for the modern corporation or managerial firm. Managerial firms 
are large corporations with such widely dispersed ownership, that no individual or 
even a small group of shareholders could .gain sufficient votes to exercise effective 
control over the firm. It is, however, possible that in a managerial firm only a few 
percent of votes are required for de facto control (Beed, 1972: 139). The former 
is the true managerial firm, while the latter could be treated as a type of hybrid 
owner-managed firm where a group of owners, though only a minority, exercises 
control over managers. The problem with the hybrid owner-managed firm is that 
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control is precarious and tends to fluctuate with the frequent formation of new 
coalitions. Such a tendency renders control unsustainable and ineffective over the 
long term. In this way, the hybrid owner-managed firm cannot be readily 
distinguished from the true managerial firm. 
The central hypothesis of Monsen and Downs (1972:351-356) is that ownership 
is dispersed among many shareholders and separated from management, and that 
management itself consists of a bureaucratic hierarchy. The fact that economies 
of scale do not exist in the provision of capital, supports the idea of a large 
managerial firm with a large number of relatively small shareholders (Demsetz, 
1988(b): 113). In the managerial firm the shareholders appoint a board of directors 
which has the ultimate power 'over management. Such delegation of power 
includes the capacity to set policy and to replace inefficient managers. Each firm 
is operated by a hierarchy of managers (separate from the shareholders) who do 
not own substantial shares in the firm. It could therefore be said that a shift has 
taken place from control by ownership to control by contract, in the sense that 
professional managers are contracted by owners to run the firm on their behalf 
(Murray, 1987). The reason for the delegation of power by the owners to 
management via the board of directors, is essentially pragmatic. If all owners were 
first to consult with each other in order to decide on managerial issues, the 
economies of scale will be neutralised by high negotiating costs. This problem 
intensities as the firm diversifies its activities into different fields of specialisation. 
Economists entertain different views as to the reasons for the great size of the 
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managerial firm. One view is that it could be necessitated by the inevitable 
prevalence of economies of scale in large scale production. The firm must be large 
enough to carry the large capita.I commitments of modern technology (Galbraith, 
1972: 128). Another view is that mere size enables the firm to exercise monopoly 
power in the market. The large size of the managerial firm enables it to earn profits 
above the levels usually associated with a perfectly competitive industry. 
However, according to Galbraith (1972:128-129), the main contributing factor to 
the large size of the managerial firm is not economies of scale or monopoly, but 
control. Size empowers management to exercise control over supply, demand, the 
provision of capital and minimisation of risk. The bigger the firm, the more control 
over these factors is bestowed upon management. Therefore there is no upper 
limit to its desirable size. It also gives them the autonomy from invasions by the 
state, trade unions and also by shareholders. 
The complexity of technical and managerial decisions in the operation of these 
large techno-structures, acts as protection against outside interfer'ence (Galbraith, 
1972: 131). Neither the suppliers of capital, nor the shareholders have the expert 
knowledge to intervene in managerial decision-making. The managing of a modern 
corporation has become a highly specialised profession that calls for technical 
expertise. Efficiency is indeed promoted if owners renounce their de facto control 
in favour of a professional management (Demsetz, 1988(b): 114). Furthermore, 
many shareholders prefer oeing relieved from the duty of day to day 
decision-making and having the opportunity to concentrate on their responsibilities 
as owner. The power of decision-making is traded for the comfort of limited 
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liability. Owners also tend to specialise in investment rather than control. 
By the provision of an internal source of capital, derived from its own profits, the 
modern corporation has isolated itself from external control or interference 
(Galbraith, 1972: 132). Financial institutions and shareholders have very little 
control over how retained earnings are invested or otherwise dealt with. The 
development of the managerial firm conferred unchecked power on management 
and separated it further from the scrutinising control of capital providers. In the 
words of Galbraith (1972:132), "few other developments can have more 
fundamentally altered the character of capitalism". 
Although shareholders retain the capacity to decide whether or not to sell their 
shares, they are essentially lenders of capital instead of owners in the true sense 
of the word (Demsetz, 1988(b): 114). Such separation of ownership and control 
holds important implications for the debate on ownership and efficiency. The goals 
and motives of professional managers as well as the monitoring of their 
performance should be analyzed in order to arrive at conclusions regarding the 
relative efficiencies of private and public firms. Similar to the traditional theory of 
the firm, both owners and managers are primarily motivated by their self-interest, 
but with the difference that they have conflicting interests and different ways of 
pursuing them. The assumption of profit maximisation, as applied in the 
neoclassical theory, would only be valid if firms were operated by the very owners 
who share in its profits. Since managers usually do not share directly in the firm's 
profits, their different self-interests lead them to behave differently regarding the 
53 
firm's profits. This has a positive effect on allocative efficiency, which will now 
be explain'ed. 
4.2 PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND THE MOVE TO ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 
The biggest concern of the private monopoly has been its tendency to inflate prices 
and contract output in order to earn monopoly rents. New forces in modern 
economies are coming to the fore causing existing private monopolies and 
oligopolies to behave more like competitive firms and reducing the allocative 
inefficiencies due to monopolistic pricing policies. These forces, which are rooted 
in the separation of ownership and control, include { 1) the emergence of sales 
maximisation as a managerial objective, (2) the increase in importance of the public 
image and social responsibility of the firm, and (3) new thinking on the competition 
between large managerial firms. 
The aggregate effect on the economy, as illustrated in Figure 5 where Y is the 
monopoly industry, is that the managerial monopoly increases its supply and lowers 
its price below that of the pure monopoly, thereby moving nearer to the 
competitive position, e.g. from M to M'. It is to the examination of the above 







4.2. 1 Sales maximisation 
One of the cornerstones of the traditional theory of the firm is the goal of profit 
maximisation. While shareholders may reasonably be assumed to be 
profit-maximisers, it has been argued that management of the modern managerial 
firm may have different objectives. The separation of ownership and control means 
that managers have greater freedom to pursue their personal objectives with little 
risk of being exposed. It also suggests that managers (and not owners) are really 
in control of modern enterprises. 
Baumol (1967) contended that sales maximisation is an important goal of 
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management, because it serves basic motives of management such as social 
standing, self-esteem and security. The social standing and power of managers are 
directly related to the number of employees or subordinates having to report to 
them as well as the mere size of the firm. Managers are also tempted to expand 
staff and gross assets, because the marginal product and therefore salary of a 
manager often depend on the size of the resources affected by his decisions 
(Mayer, 1960: 189-193). The pursuit of these objectives are more important to the 
manager than to achieve excessive profits. These objectives motivate 
managements of modern firms (even monopolies) to expand output and reduce 
prices -- a tendency which is in the opposite direction of that usually associated 
with monopolies and which, in effect, represents a movement towards the 
competitive position. 
Thorstein Veblen ( 1924) believed that the separation of ownership and control in 
the managerial firm contributed to allocative efficiency. He preferred control to be 
in the hands of professional managers who are interested in output growth rather 
than monopolists who lean towards the contraction of output and inflation of 
prices. In this way, the notion of sales maximisation is a positive move towards 
the improvement of allocative efficiency. 
4.2.2 Public image and social responsibility 
A recent development in the style of management which has important effects on 
allocative efficiency, is the emphasis placed on the public image and social 
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responsibility of the firm (Bibb and Bendix, 1991 :43-59). Milton Friedman 
( 1962: 1 33-1 35) regarded the idea of corporate officials pursuing social 
responsibility, rather than serving the interests of their owners, as 
counter-productive and undermining the very foundations of the free society. He 
argued that entrepreneurs should stick to what they do best, namely maximising 
profits on behalf of their stockholders, in which case the element of free 
competition will guide the industry like an invisible hand to serve the public 
interest. They have neither the political legitimacy nor the public expertise to 
perform the public functions of taxation, expenditure and control -- tasks belonging 
to elected politicians of social democracies. He is of opinion that businessmen who 
sacrifice profits in order to make a social contribution, actually take capital 
(dividends) out of the hands of shareholders and prevent them from deciding for 
themselves how surplus funds should be invested. 
Friedman may have disregarded the modern trend of monopolisation and the 
separation of ownership and control in respect of the modern corporation. The 
technical expertise of management and the growing complexity of their 
accountability, have caused shareholders to renounce their power of control in 
favour of management. Shareholders also prefer to diversify their investments to 
reduce risks and are content to be specialised owner-investors. They will only 
invest in those firms which they believe have a management competent and 
efficient enough to manage their capital on their behalf. To use Friedman's line of 
argument, specialised owner-investors should have the opportunity to do what they 
do best, namely seeking the best available investment opportunities. In the same 
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way specialised managers should be entrusted with what they do best, namely 
managing the capital invested in a specific firm. 
The balance of power however, is in the process of shiftir:ig towards the broad 
community. In developing countries especially, the- Marxist and socialist critique 
against capitalism has established a suspicion that the large corporation would 
abuse the extensive power at its disposal in favour of sectional interests and to the 
detriment of the community at large. The perception was that self-interested 
allocative decision-making by management {checked only to a lesser degree by 
owners and competitors) would bring about substantial harm to society. 
The worldwide movement to greater democracy contributed vastly to the 
empowerment of the majority against the "oppressive forces" iri society. The 
suspicion towards large business as well as the democratisation of society brought 
about new checks on the allocative decision-making process. The belief that large 
corporations have great power and that shareholders do not control their 
corporations, contributed to such suspicion {Demsetz, 1988{b) :257-258). 
Nowadays, the large corporation is being seen as a social institution with a social 
responsibility to society apart from its responsibility to its owners {Bibb and Bendix, 
1 9.91 : 54). The large corporation has come to reflect a very prominent public image 
which is duly scrutinised by politicians, consumers and the media. 
Politicians use their legislative power to align managerial behaviour and perceived 
public interest. Consumers use the instrument of consumer boycotts to express 
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their preferences. The media has also become a powerful instrument in uncovering 
malpractice and informing the public of managerial decisions. The media is indeed 
in a position to build or to break down the sensitive public image of the large 
corporation. Not only does it act as the watchdog of society, but it also articulates 
the social responsibility of management and the general public interest. The media 
furthermore embodies a strong persuasive power aimed at influencing the 
decision-making of managers who are very concerned about the public image of 
their firm as reflected by the media. 
Friedman's fear that businessmen are in no position to determine their social 
responsibility (other than maximising profits) is made less justified by these new 
developments. The prime objective of entrepreneurs has changed from maximum 
profits, based on narrow self-interest, to optimum long term profit based on 
enlightened self-interest (Tusenius, 1985). The firm will still be maximising its own 
utility, but its utility is now extended to include living up to a positive public image. 
Social responsibility activities, contributing to the public image of the firm, may 
exert a positive influence on the firm's transactions with third parties, thus adding 
to the demand for its product or service and boosting its profit (Black, 1995:6-7). 
In this way the pursuit of a better public image is related to the notion of 
profit-maximisation. Management will have to reconcile the internal forces (owners 
and workers) with the external forces (politicians, consumers and media) in order 
to arrive at an equilibrium providing for satisfactory profits, wages and social 
contribution. Society has become an increasingly complex environment for 
efficient decision-making, but management too has become more sophisticated and 
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specialised. A sophisticated management will be able to process the claims from 
different pressure groups in order to come up with a satisfactory compromise for 
the managerial firm and the broad community. 
Public demand for a higher level of social responsibility on the part of large 
corporations; has grown in recent times. Especially in a highly politicised society 
like South Africa with a history of colonisation and apartheid, the sentiments of the 
majority strongly .favour bigger involvement of business in rectifying historic 
imbalances (Bibb and Bendix, 1991 :49-51). South Africa's first democratic 
elections in 1 994 endorsed the policy of affirmative action aimed at eradicating 
poverty and uplifting backward communities. The strong reliance on this policy by 
the ANC during election campaigns, raised the expectations of its supporters of the 
relief to be brought about by the implementation of such policies. Big businesses 
offered their co-operation regarding this policy and now face the task of satisfying 
the intense popular demand for large-scale socio-economic relief. The social 
responsibility of managerial firms in the democratic South Africa has increased 
greatly. Large corporations find it in their long term interest rather to cut their 
monopoly rents, expand output and invest in social upliftment, than to be labelled 
as an oppressive capitalist concern. Investment in social responsibility action may 
er:ihance the legitimacy of the firm and create a more stable environment which is 
conducive to economic efficiency in general. 
It is of cou_rse not the task of management to formulate social goals, but it will 
have to follow the policies as articulated by the democratically elected government. 
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Bibb and Bendix ( 1991 :48) maintain that "the neat conceptual distinction between 
private economic goals and public, social goals -- the former to be pursued by 
businessmen, the latter by elected leaders -- simply does not hold up in reality". 
Examples of such social involvement in South Africa include investment in training, 
education, municipal services and housinQ. In this way, the monopolistic behaviour 
of large firms is reversed and allocative efficiency is improved. 
4.2.3 Managerial firms and competition 
Although it is not the purpose of this dissertation to discuss ways to improve the 
level of competition in the market, it can be mentioned that new thinking OQ the 
competition in the market of the modern monopoly and managerial firm has come 
to the fore. When it became evident that the full conditions of the perfect 
competition model were not practically realisable, Clarke suggested an alternative 
model of workable competition, selected from those that are practically possible 
(Devine, 1979:318). The essential ingredient of this form of competition (which is 
aimed at oligopolistic markets) is rivalry, either actual or potential, among 
profit-maximising suppliers who vie among themselves for the customer's 
patronage (Devine, 1979:318). It is, however, based on the unrealistic assumption 
that the long run average cost curves of new firms are substantially the same as 
those of the established firms (Stigler, 1942:2-3). 
This model, suggested in 1940, was the forerunner to Baumol's model of 
contestable markets (Baumol, 1982: 1-7). The contestability model proposes that, 
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since the presence of many competing firms in the same market is not a necessary 
condition for achieving allocative efficiency, the existence of only a small number 
of firms in a particular market does not, in itself, imply monopoly power and 
allocative inefficiency (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988:20). Even though a market may 
be monopolistic or oligopolistic, certain conditions may come into play which make 
it contestable and thus allocatively more efficient. These conditions are, firstly, 
that decreasing returns to scale should have set in and, secondly, that entry into 
the market should be free and unrestricted and exit from it costless (Truu, 1 988: 
263). If these conditions are met, any monopoly price in excess of average cost 
would create profitable opportunities for new entrants and expose the monopolist 
to the hit-and-run strategies of potential contenders who are instantly ready to 
collect the available monopoly rent before being forced out again (Cook and 
Kirkpatrick, 1988:20). 
The policy implication is that the government should endeavour to make markets 
more contestable by removing entry barriers and thereby preparing the ground for 
allocatively efficient pricing by the monopoly or oligopoly (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 
1988:20). It is however, not adequate to remove entry barriers while the existence 
of "sunk" costs (costs that cannot be eliminated when production stops) rules out 
/ 
the possibility of a free and costless exit by the firm finding it unprofitable to 
remain within the market (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988:20). The condition of free 
entry is difficult to realise in the wake of monopolies which dominate the industry 
by their size and scope of activities and which would not be intimidated by the 
remo~e possibility. of hit-and-run contenders (Veljanovski, 1989:28). 
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Even though these conditions will not easily be met in practice, this model draws 
the attention to the fact that potential competition can serve as a check on the 
uncompetitive market and enforce an allocative outcome which is a step towards 
the classic Pareto-optimal position. 
In the case of industries with only a few large producers, increased competition 
could contribute to increased levels of output and lower prices, and thereby rectify 
allocative inefficiency. It is the view of Stigler ( 1 942) that competition among large 
enterprises is stimulated by relaxing the restrictio_n on mergers and by giving them 
a clear mandate to grow through the use of fair means. In the USA mergers 
enabled managements to build more diversified and better integrated enterprises. 
Such enterprises are capable of reaching all parts of the market and are particularly 
adaptable to market shifts, changes in technology and variations of economic 
climate (Mansfield, 1968: 115). They are also favourably positioned to support 
technological research and development. 
Competition within an industry where production is concentrated among only a few 
large firms tends to be vigorous for two reasons (Mansfield, 1968:1 7). Firstly, 
because the competitors are easily identifiable, the participants keep close track of 
the market position and behaviour of their rivals. Secondly, the growth in 
investment on research and development by large firms has intensified the 
competitiveness of the concentrated industries and has increased the quality of 
competition among large firms which is far superior to that among small firms 
(Mansfield, 1968: 17). The innovative investment of large firms in the long term 
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offers a wider range of choice to the consumer -- something the small firm could 
not at all afford (Mansfield, 1968: 18) . 
. 4.3 SUMMARY 
In conclusion it can be said that the separation of ownership and control in the 
modern managerial firm has helped to restrict the rise in prices and decline in 
output previously related to large firms operating in uncompetitive markets. The 
monopolisation of the private sector and its effect on price and output have been 
the strongest critique against private ownership and specifically its performance in 
respect of allocative efficiency. It has been submitted here that the modern 
managerial firm is behaving more and more as if operating in a competitive market, 
,· 
especially due to the managerial objective of sales-maximisation and the increasing 
importance of the public image of the firm. The question which we will now 
consider is to what extent productive efficiency is sacrificed by the rise of the 
managerial firm and the improvement in allocative efficiency. 
64 
CHAPTER 5: OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY 
5.1 BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
One of the main weaknesses of the public enterprise is its poor track record 
regarding productive efficiency. The general mistrust of the public enterprise 
during the 1970's and the increasing popularity of privatisation policies ensued 
from this public failure. But how serious is this deficiency? And in what way is 
it caused by public ownership? Furthermore, would a change of ownership be a 
sufficient remedy? This chapter deals with the factors inherent to ownership 
(public or private), that have an influence on the productive efficiency of the firm. 
Adam Smith (1937) believed that publicly owned land was 25% less productive 
than privately owned land. He gave the following reason for his statement: "The 
attention of the sovereign can be at best a very general and vague consideration 
of what is likely to contribute to the better cultivation of the greater part of his 
dominions. The attention of the landlord is a particular and minute consideration 
of what is most likely the most advantageous application of every inch of ground 
upon his estate". 
Empirical evidence confirms Smith's opinion by indicating clearly the gains in 
productive efficiency experienced by state-owned monopolies or oligopolies after 
privatisation (Moore, 1992: 119). The UK's experience of the 1980's shows how 
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the productivity per employee of British Airways and British Gas had risen by 20%. 
Labour disruptions at Associated British Ports declined rapidly after privatisation. 
Furthermore, the overall call-failure rate at British Telecom dropped from one in 
twenty five to one in two hundred and the traditionally long waiting list to have a 
telephone installed virtually disappeared. In respect of public telephones, statistics 
indicate that while only 75% were operational before privatisation in 1980, 96% 
were in working condition in 1992. In respect of developing countries, 
Ramanadham ( 1984:11 9) arrives at the conclusion that the financial performance 
of public enterprises is, in general, poor.* Nellis and Kikeri (1989:664) state that 
considerable empirical evidence indicates that higher rates of return on total assets 
employed in the private sector of developing countries could be found than those 
prevailing in roughly comparable undertakings in the public sector. 
The factors to be analyzed here are the role of trade unions (5.2), the motivation 
and incentives of managers (i.e. fear of bankruptcy and take-overs, managerial 
needs and goals) (5.3), the performance monitoring by owners and the capital 
market (5.4), rent-seeking (5.5), innovation (5.6) and managerial competency (5. 7) . 
. Traditionally these factors formed the ideological basis of the arguments favouring 
private and denouncing public ownership. Too little emphasis, however, had been 
put on the ownership structure within the firm. 
• This view is substantiated by research done by the International Workshop· on Financial Profitability and Losses in Public Enterprises, 
ICPE. Ljubljana, 1981 :23 ]. 
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In this chapter, therefore, the traditional arguments will be confined to a 
comparison of public firms on the one hand and owner-managed firms on the other 
hand. The traditional conclusion to be derived from such an analysis, is that 
private ownership, where owners exercise direct control over management, is 
conducive to optimum productive efficiency. In respect of the modern managerial 
firm, however, the model of Monsen and Downs allows for the separation of 
ownership and control. These characteristics led to the attenuation of owners' 
capacity to monitor and control the firm's performance, resulting in a deterioration 
of productive efficiency, as managers are given freedom to pursue their personal 
goals. This development may eventually force owners to revise their goal of 
maximum profits and to adopt the second best goal of satisfactory profits. When 
this happens the foundation for long term productive inefficiency is laid. In respect 
of its bureaucratic nature and monitoring capacity, the managerial firm may be 
found to behave similarly to the public firm, exhibiting the same drawbacks 
regarding productive efficiency. It will be argued however, that the private 
managerial firm is still to be preferred to the public enterprise insofar as productive 
efficiency is concerned. 
5.2 ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS 
The underlying idea of this section is that the management of the public enterprise, 
in comparison with its private counterpart, is more exposed and vulnerable to the 
mounting pressure exercised by increasingly powerful trade unions. Such pressure 
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is aimed at furthering the interest of employees in the name of social democracy, 
regardless of the detrimental effects on productive efficiency and the implications 
for the public interest. It is submitted that the rise in power of trade unions 
vis-a-vis public enterprises is. an important cause of productive inefficiency in the 
public sector. 
It should be kept in mind that many trade unions were established in pursuit of the 
Marxist concept of a worker's party government that would protect worker's 
interests against capitalist powers (Murray, 1987). The rise in trade unionism 
provided a way of countering the power of governments and especially the public 
monopolies that were believed to be abusing· their power at the expense of their 
employees. In some countries trade unions gained enough support to switch the 
balance of political and economic power in their favour. Although trade unions 
also operate widely in the private sector, it will be shown that they found the 
public sector a much more favourable battle field and one on which they were met 
with less resistance by management. In other words, the bargaining power of the 
public sector trade union is generally stronger than that of its counterpart in the 
private sector (Killick and Commander, 1988: 1472). This phenomenon could be 
explained with reference to political, economic an·d ideological considerations. 
Firstly, the public sector trade union tends to have considerable political power. 
It is submitted that trade unions find themselves in a stronger bargaining position 
vis-a-vis the public as opposed to the private enterprise. This notion arises from 
the fact that unions not only form economic, but also political pressure groups 
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against the government and the central budget. It finds itself in a position to exert 
influence as a pressure group representing not only employees, but also 
enfranchised citizens. In the private sector disagreements are resolved internally 
through negotiations between management and union leaders and within the 
financial limitations as prescribed by the rules of commercial viability. Public sector 
trade unions, on the other hand, have the tendency to transform the matters in 
dispute into political issues with popular appeal. Unions from different industries 
in the public sector consolidate to form a monopoly power block against the state 
as their common employer. This is facilitated by the fact that all public employees 
share the same objective namely to bargain for higher wages and better working 
conditions for their members. 
The organisation structure provided by trade unions is also very susceptible· to 
political abuse by union leaders. Their captive membership is easy to mobilise, 
while their common grievances and aims act as a bonding agent uniting the 
workers in a strong political lobbying group against the government, which is likely 
to be singled out as the scapegoat when their claims are not met. The matters in 
dispute are then extended by politically active union leaders to include issues of 
ideology. These issues fall outside their mandate as worker representatives and 
cause confusion in the negotiation process with management. The government 
may find it difficult to resist the political pressure in addition to the financial 
restraints it has to cope with. In the end the additional bargaining power enables 
trade unions to negotiate wage increases beyond pro~uctivity levels. 
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Secondly, financial considerations strengthen the bargaining power of trade unions. 
The fact that the central budget is always available as a safety net for public 
' 
enterprises makes it difficult and politically sensitive for management to deny 
workers' claims on financial considerations alone. According to Roy ( 1980:46) a 
public enterprise does not serve capitalistic interests, but is answerable primarily 
to government and therefore cannot easily check workers' demands. While the 
government assumes the role of rescuer of last resort, there will be no ceiling to 
the claims of trade unions. Public ownership tends to raise expectations of 
workers who come to believe that they have a right to jobs and that wages should 
be paid regardless of productivity considerations (Pryke, 1981 :265). Public 
employees regard their claims and expectations as reasonable in the light of their 
perception that the government cannot go bankrupt and will always provide the 
necessary funds when the public enterprise is in trouble. Any denial of what the 
unions may regard as a reasonable demand, will be perceived by the workers as 
a politically prejudiced decision by the government on the allocation of available 
resources. In the case of the private firm, labour and management are opposing 
interests, and even though the process of collective bargaining is prone to conflict, 
some degree of equilibrium is eventually reached (Roy, 1 980:46). The difference 
is that the rules of commercial viability act as an objective criterion governing the 
outcome 0f collective bargaining in the private sector. 
Thirdly, the claims of trade unions are backed by strong historic ideological 
considerations. The source of the high expectations within public trade unions can 
be found in the Marxist notion that the workers are the real owners of the public 
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enterprise and that they should not be alienated from the product of their labour. 
This ideology was strongly advocated by trade unionists all over the world. It gave 
momentum to the workers' struggle for self-determination or for a larger say in 
management and the allocation of resources. Employees of public enterprises thus 
obtained an elevated status. Not only did they view themselves as ordinary 
citizens in whose favour the public enterprise should be run and who have the 
ability to influence management and government decisions by casting their votes 
during elections, but they also regarded themselves as the real owners of the 
enterprise who should have a direct say in allocative decision-making. The opinion 
was held that the public enterprise should in the first place be managed in the 
interest of the workers and only in the second place in the interest of the general 
public. This resulted in trade unions pressuring the government to raise wages 
even if it meant subsidising productive inefficiency from government coffers and 
subsequent tax increases. According to Murray (1987), reforming the labour 
market was seen by "socialists" as one of the prime goals of public ownership. 
More specifically these goals entailed improved working conditions, industrial 
democracy, equal opportunities, increased flexibility of working time and 
human-centred technology. However, these goals were pursued without due 
consideration of financial and commercial realities and productivity. 
The rise of trade unionism resulted in the reduction of productive efficiency in the 
public sector. Trade unions succeeded in bargaining wage settlements and other 
employee perquisites above productivity levels, while at the same time preventing 
concomitant redundancies of public employees and rises in the price of public 
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goods. This accounts for the fact that public enterprises are characterised by 
unstable labour relations resulting in many lost man-hours and x-inefficiency due 
to strike actions and labour disputes respectively. The result is public sector 
production below the Production Possibility Curve, indicating a lo~s to society in 
the form of productive inefficiency. 
Likewise, if governments comply with wage demands and maintain too high levels 
of employment, productive inefficiency may result. During the 1970's in the UK, 
public trade unions became increasingly powerful and militant. During 1971, 1972 
and 1974 in the UK the nationalised section, one of the most strongly unionised 
in the economy, which accounted for only 7% of all employment, had to endure 
no less than 40%-50% of all days lost in strike actions (Pryke, 1980:224). After 
it was nationalised, British Rail (one of the six largest employers in Britain) was 
under continued pressure from trade unions to maintain high employment levels 
and to maximise the size of its staff, even when economic viability prescribed 
necessary redundancies (Wolf, 1979:120). The result was high employment per 
unit of service which is enough incentive for on-the-job slackness and inertia by 
managers and workers alike (Wolf, 1979: 120). This deyelopment provided an 
important rationale for the inception of the policy of privatisation in the UK. When 
the Conservative Party came to power in 1 979 it gave momentum· to this process 
and gave public enterprises an ultimatum to raise domestic prices in order to cover 
average costs, and insisted that wages should not exceed productivity (Pryke, 
1981 :265). 
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As would be expected in the light of the above, the policy of privatisation was 
vehemently opposed by public sector trade unions. Union leaders argued that such 
a policy will adversely affect employees if, subsequent to privatisation, the firm 
goes bankrupt, government subsidies are discontinued, or there are forced lay-offs 
by the new private owner (Van de Walle, 1989:606). The true concern of trade 
unions, however, was more likely the fact that privatisation would remove politics 
as a bargaining tool, alter the industrial relations climate in favour of management, 
and generally upset a longstanding modus vivendi with the government (Curwen, 
1986: 167). The resistance of public trade unions to privatisation and to the 
commercialisation of struggling public enterprises, must be seen in the light of the 
Marxist view of the private ownership as a bearer o.f forces that discipline labour 
and promote capital accumulation (Murray, 1987). The ideology was that 
capitalists are trying to control labour, speed up production and press down wages 
in order to generate surpluses for capital accumulation. Trade unions wanted to 
reverse this drive by demanding extended public ownership aimed at goals that 
conflict with capital accumulation namely higher wages, better working conditions, 
more human-centred jobs, equality on the factory floor and greater industrial 
democracy (Murray, 1987). Privatisation would mean that the bargaining power 
of labour unions would be stripped from its political element and reduced to bare 
economics. They were reluctant firstly to sacrifice their political power base and 
secondly to support a policy that means redundancies and lower wages even when 
it is aimed at improving productive efficiency. 
Union leaders would argue that it is socially undesirable to improve efficiency at a 
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time of general unemployment. It is their view that inefficient employment, 
although substantially the same as disguised unemployment, is still to be preferred 
to the demoralisation and humiliation of open unemployment. Seen in perspective 
.. 
however, it is clear that in discontinuing unproductive and unprofitable activities, 
cross-subsidisation can ·be eliminated and prices reduced to cover costs (Pryke, 
1981 :256). This can be the spark to generate compensating output and 
employment elsewhere in the economy. On the other hand, the maintenance of 
unproductive employment in public enterprises would inevitably lead to fewer jobs 
elsewhere. 
The basic premise of the market system is that different participants compete on 
an equal footing, with the bargaining power of each acting as a check and balance 
on the power of others. It is submitted that public ownership, in light of the 
considerations mentioned, creates the breeding ground for excessive trade union 
bargaining power resulting in prolonged productive inefficiency. Selective 
privatisation could therefore contribute towards levelling. the playing fields by 
reducing excessive trade union power and restoring the balance between the 
wellbeing of the workers and the interests of the public at large. 
5.3 MOTIVATION AND INCENTIVES 
A further factor favouring private ownership as opposed to public ownership is the 
nature of managerial motivation and incentives. In the words of Yarrow (1989:53), 
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"ownership matters because the transfer of a firm from the public sector to the 
private sector (or vice versa) will lead to a change in the incentive structures facing 
its decision-makers". Furubotn and Pejovich ( 1972: 1139) also believed that once 
human motivations are known, a better understanding of the organisation's use of 
resources becomes possible. The fear of bankruptcy and take-overs in the 
traditional owner-managerial firm presented private management with real 
incentives to be productive, while their personal needs and goals provided the 
necessary motivation. 
5.3.1 Fear of bankruptcy 
The fear of bankruptcy serves as a strong motivation and incentive for superior 
managerial performance in the private sector vis-a-vis the public sector, the reason 
being that public managers and employees are not subjected to this fear, due to 
their reliance on the continuous support provided by the state budget. History has 
shown that the government will intervene to help ailing public enterprises, either 
to save political face or to pursue broad policy goals like stability and growth. 
Politicians will rather increase subsidies than having to explain to the electorate 
why certain public goods cannot be supplied any more and why public employees 
have to lose their jobs. These are politically more sensitive issues than the issue 
of increasing subsidies. This characteristic of public firms results in a lack of a 
struggle for survival, and is an ideal breeding-ground for productive inefficiency in 
the public sector. 
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Privatisation introduces the discipline of hard budgets and commercial capital 
markets as opposed to the "soft budget constraint" so often enjoyed by public 
firms (Nellis ~rnd Kikeri, 1989:663): Efficiency' improves as long as there is an 
urgency to maximise profits or at least to keep the firm in business. A complacent 
management risks the chance of going bankrupt in which case the resources 
released would be employed by those who have the urgency to utilise it more 
efficiently (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989:663). It could be argued that the lack of 
competition could render the incentive of the fear of bankruptcy less effective. It 
is submitted, however, that under the same market circumstances, private firms, 
with or without competition, will be more productively efficient than public firms 
as a result of this incentive. 
The prevalence of a soft budget constraint in the public sector and the fact that 
government will not allow public firms to go bankrupt, contribute to removing an 
important productivity incentive from the minds of public managers and employees. 
This has led to the bureaucratic red tape and slackness that are so often 
encountered in public firms or services. The same has occurred in the modern 
private sector with the appearance of the large conglomerate firm. The holding 
company provides a safety net for struggling subsidiaries aimed at protecting the 
public image of the group at large. Successful subsidiaries are used by the holding. 
firm to cross-subsidise loss-making firms within the group. This trend seriously 
reduces the threat of bankruptcy as an important efficiency incentive to the 
management of the subsidiary. 
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The question is whether this cause of productive inefficiency would be more 
prominent in a public firm than in a large private conglomerate. The lack of a fear 
of bankruptcy in the private sector is made good by the existence of another 
incentive namely the fear that the holding company may sell the subsidiary if it 
continues to burden the group. In an environment of strong competition for 
investment capital, it is inconceivable that a large conglomerate would persist in 
subsidising ailing subsidiaries on a permanent basis. It must be conceded that this 
threat will only be realised in the last resort if nothing could reasonably be done to 
reverse the fortunes of the subsidiary. However, it remains a real threat and will 
be a contributing factor in keeping managers on their toes and so promoting 
productive efficiency. 
5.3.2 Fear of take-overs 
According to Hanke ( 1986:16) public and private enterprises could be distinguished 
by " ... the fact that public assets are not owned since they cannot effectively be 
transferred. This lack of transferability means that decisions taken by public 
bureaucrats and employees do not readily translate into changes in the market price 
of the firm's assets." 
Citizens dissatisfied with the way in which a public firm is managed, cannot sell 
their traction of "ownership" to others. This is an important difference between 
public and private ownership that has a bearing on productive efficiency. In the 
private sector shares and assets become tradable and a market for managers 
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develops where managers could easily be replaced if they do· not live up to the 
expectations of owners (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989:663). Disillusioned private 
shareholders have the option of voting with their feet by selling their shares to 
outsiders. 
The ability to sell shares engenders the possibility of a take-over. This possibility 
poses a real threat to managers in the private sector. If an investor sells his 
shares, he will be perceived to be expressing his disapproval of the firm's 
managerial performance. Share prices will fall in direct proportion to the number 
of shares sold, thereby inviting ne_w investors with new ideas about managerial 
efficiency to take over the firm (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972: 1130). The rationale 
behind take-overs is vested in the confidence of capitalist outsiders in the capacity 
of the firm to outperform current levels by reducing existing organisational slack 
and promoting productive efficiency. Share price partly reflects the potential 
capital gain inherent in the corporate stock; and the lower the share price, relative 
to the potential under more efficient management, the greater the danger for a 
take-over by those who believe that management can be more efficient. In the 
event of a take-over, managers and employees would be at risk of losing their jobs 
as part of a rationalisation programme by the new owners, who would want to 
stamp their authority on the firm by employing a new motivated team of managers 
and employees aimed at improving productive efficiency. The threat of take-overs 
is therefore a strong incentive for managerial performance. 
Shareholders can exercise this capacity to sell their shares independently of other 
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shareholders and can exercise it without dissolving the firm (Demsetz, 
1988(b):114). Furthermore, negotiating costs in trading shares are reduced by the 
fact that shareholders are protected by their limited liability. This quality removes 
the duty of potential owners fully to inform themselves of the performance and 
liabilities of the firm and of the assets of other shareholders before deciding to buy 
or sell shares. These attributes facilitate the effectiveness of this incentive 
mechanism and promote the development of an organised market for securities. 
Demsetz ( 1988(b): 114) maintains that the smoother this market operates, the 
more important the incentive of the fear of take-overs will be. 
The continuous pressure of potential take-overs may, however have a detrimental 
effect on allocative efficiency in that it could move managers to concentrate on 
short-term profits in order to bolster share prices and thereby neglect long term 
considerations. However, as Grossman and Hart (1980:42-64) point out, the 
relationship between the capital market and productive efficiency can be 
complicated, due to factors such as transaction costs, free-rider problems and lack 
of sufficient information by shareholders. The higher the cost of (a) gathering 
inside information of the firm, (b) actually trading the shares, and (c) preventing 
other shareholders from following suit without having to share the costs, the less 
imminent will be the risk of take-overs. 
However, the question can be raised whether the threat of privatisation could not 
serve as a similar incentive for enhanced productive efficiency in the public sector. 
The management of a struggling public firm could be warned by government that 
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it will privatise the firm if improved productive efficiency is not achieved within a 
certain period of time. Incumbent public managers will. dread a "privatisation" 
take-over to the same degree as will private managers when confronted with an 
ordinary take-over. It should be borne in mind however, that the privatisation of 
a public firm could only be carried out after its endorsement by a slow and 
cumbrous political process. Such a policy decision is always politically s.ensitive 
and usually provokes wide controversy among managers, employees and the public 
who are in effect the real "owners" of the public good. The threat of privatisation 
is not as imminent and therefore does not contain the same incentive value as a 
private take-over. 
A case has been made out that private management's fear of a possible take-over 
acts as a real incentive for the maximisation of productive efficiency. In the case 
of a take-over, managers fear that new owners would try to achieve higher 
productive efficiency by pressuring and disciplining existing managers or by 
replacing incumbents who cannot perform according to new standards. In respect 
of the diffused ownership managerial firm, however, this performance incentive has 
been severely attenuated. In the managerial firm owners find themselves separated 
from management and therefore from the operation of the firm (as fully discussed 
earlier). As a result, managers are inclined to screen unfavourable information from 
shareholders and the board of directors. The high costs of gathering information 
prevents the establishment of a well-informed ownership. Due to the large number 
of owners, they will also be slow to react on news of inefficiency in the 
management of the firm. At least while managers of the large managerial firms are 
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in a position to conceal "detrimental information" from the shareholders, they can 
put to rest any fear of a possible take-over. Without information on poor 
managerial performance, existing shareholders will not be in a position to 
reconsider their ownership. Potential buyers will also not be aware of the value of 
unexploited opportunities in the firm. In this way an important incentive to 
productive efficiency within the managerial firm is being sacrificed. To illustrate 
how much value managers can destroy before they face a serious threat from 
shareholders, Jensen (1989:64) contends that between 1977 and 1988, takeovers 
and buyouts in the USA averaged 50% above the market price of the shares. 
These takeovers not only create new value but also unlock the value destroyed by 
management through productive inefficiency. The problem with the managerial 
firm is therefore that managers find themselves in a very secure position vis-a-vis 
outsiders. They can destroy much value and underutilise the potential of the firm 
for a long period before having to face the threat of a possible takeover. 
It is, however, possible for the managerial firm to behave like the classic 
concentrated ownership firm in respect of this incentive. The threat of take-overs 
is not only applicable to a change of ownership of majority shareholding. A 
"take-over" could also be effected by a group of minority shareholders. If several 
minority shareholders are dissatisfied with the existing managerial policies and 
performance, but do not want to terminate their ownership, they can try to gain 
effective control temporarily to oust the incumbent management or to force 
through new policy (Demsetz, 1988(b):131). They can do this by concentrating 
shareholding in the hands of a group of shareholders with similar views on the 
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management of the firm. Proxy battles and share-purchases as well as the 
formation of voting blocks can be used as mechanisms to translate ownership into 
de facto control and decisive action (Demsetz, 1988(b):1 31). These mechanisms 
increase the risk for managers to be replaced if they d_o not cooperate with the 
shareholders who have effective control. Such behaviour will have a positive 
bearing on productive efficiency. 
In the public sector there are very limited possibilities for citizens (as the true 
owners) to take quick steps to alter policies within the firm. Citizens will have to 
follow the complex and sometimes hazardous political avenue,·as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Lobbying power could be used to persuade politiCians to act 
quickly in serious cases. However, the threat of a "take-over" will only be real at 
the time of a general election when the position of the governing party could be 
challenged. With regard to this incentive of productive efficiency, it would 
therefore seem as if the prjvate managerial firm will be preferable to the public firm. 
5.3.3 Personal needs and goals of managers 
In the analysis of productive efficiency, it is not only the objectives of managers 
and employees as representatives of the firm that matter, but also their own 
; 
personal needs and goals. One must not disregard the fact that managers and 
I 
I 
employees are in the first place utility· maximising human beings who will be 
inclined to put their personal interest before that of the firm, except where they 
could be persuaded that it is in their own personal interest to pursue the interests 
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of the firm. We will now consider the managerial needs and goals in the private, 
public and managerial firms respectively. 
5.3.3.1 The private firm 
In the owner-managed firm, the self-interest of the manager usually coincides with 
the traditional motive of profit maximisation. High productive efficiency will mean 
lower costs to produce a given output and higher profits in the pockets of the 
owner-manager. The profit motive is always a strong incentive for private 
owner-managers to pursue productive efficiency. This motive inspires managers 
to eliminate slack and unproductiveness, because they personally share in the fruits 
thereof, i.e. increased dividends and value of their shareholding. The motive of 
profit maximisation has indeed been the backbone of arguments favouring private 
ownership in respect of productive efficiency, but this motive would only be 
applicable in cases of relatively small owner-managed firms, where owners 
participate in administrative and operational decisions and where they are in a 
position to control the performance of their employees. With direct and 
well-defined property rights, managers will be in the position to restrain employees 
from behaving in an indiscretionary manner for their personal benefit (Killick and 
Commander, 1988: 1470). In these cases the owner-managed private firm has an 
advantage over the public firm, because the performance of managers is directly 
related to the return on their investment, whereas public managers are civil 
servants with no such financial stake in the profits of the firm. It could therefore 
be said that shareholding by managers and employees is an important motivational 
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force towards productive efficiency. 
In respect of larger private firms, however, it is debatable what degree of owner 
shareholding is required to render this motive effective. In many countries 
managerial shareholding and worker participation schemes have been introduced 
with limited success. Small nominal shareholding does not empower the worker 
with effective control. This could lead to frustrated ownership, which is not at all 
conducive to a motivated work force. If workers could be persuaded that their 
contribution to productive efficiency would strengthen the value of their shares, the 
incentive would be real. However, the capital gain for the shareholding employee 
is relatively small. The Marxist critique that workers are alienated from the product 
of their labour is true to the. extent that a free-rider problem exists and that workers 
in large firms do not experience a direct correlation between the amount of effort 
invested by them and the size of their remuneration. This motive is only truly 
effective in the case of the traditional owner-managed firm. 
5.3.3.2 The public firm 
Public ownership, on the other hand, exhibits certain disincentives in respect of 
profit-maximisation and productive efficiency. Firstly, as Van de Walle (1989:605) 
points out, managerial incentives to maximise profits and minimise costs are 
undermined by the tendency of politicians to set inconsistent and contradictory 
goals for public managers. The enforcement of different political goals, creates 
confusion with public managers as to which results they are expected to achieve. 
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A basic precondition for a motivated management is that they should know exactly 
what to do to satisfy their superiors and to qualify for promotion. If they are 
required simultaneously to pursue contradictory goals such as the expansion of the 
work force as well as the maximisation of profits, it is to be expected that their 
vision will be clouded and their motivation repressed. Especially in developing 
countries, politicians often force public enterprises to overstretch their limited 
managerial and administrative capacities with too many peripheral activities, and 
consequently to sacrifice productive efficiency (Van de Walle: 1989:606). 
Secondly, the public sector has experienced diffiGulties in reconciling the efficiency 
objectives of the firm with personal goals of bureaucrats or public managers. Such 
a situation is a perfect breeding ground for productive inefficiency. The personal 
motives and objectives of bureaucrats are usually inconsistent with that of profit 
maximisation and include the maximisation of salaries, perquisites, power and 
social standing (Niskanen, 1971). In the absence of the profit motive, public 
managers will tend to pursue other broad goals such as budget maximisation, risk 
aversion and over-manning. The above-mentioned confusion of objectives also 
makes it difficult to introduce managerial incentive schemes in the public firm. In 
the light of the lack of effective performance monitoring mechanisms in the public 
sector (which will be discussed later), managers and employees have the freedom 
to pursue personal goals, such as promotion and salary increases, to the detriment 
of the firm. Personal ambition could be pursued without working harder because 
efficiency is rarely the main criterion in determining remuneration packages. 
Seniority in the firm and loyalty to superiors instead of efficiency are often used as 
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criteria in promotion decisions. This means that public managers and employees 
could indulge in organisational slack and easy working conditions without 
endangering their future career opportunities. 
In the private sector, however, managers and employees receive salaries which are 
more directly linked to profitability and productivity than their public counterparts 
(Nellis and Kikeri, 1989:663). Promotion, remuneration and performance are 
closely aligned. Private managers are also given a simpler yet more demanding set 
of signals and incentives aimed at achieving efficiency objectives of the firm (Nellis 
and Kikeri, 1989:663). Private managers, who want to satisfy their personal 
ambition, are in a better position than public managers to influence the size of their 
salaries and the progress in their careers by improving the efficiency of their 
performance. 
Thirdly, public managers and bureaucrats tend to have an input approach towards 
productive efficiency. They seem to be preoccupied with the maximisation of 
budgeted costs and its reconciliation with actual costs, and not with the 
minimisation of both. Bureaucrats will favour the expansion of staff, because more 
hands to do the same quantity of work will give more idle time during which they 
could pursue personal objectives. Public managers will also favour a recruitment 
drive, because their social standing and power tend to grow in stature with the 
amount of subordinates having to report to them. Bureaucratic objectives are 
strongly related to the size of the government grant allocated to individual public 
firms. Surplus government funds will be used to finance inefficient behaviour. It 
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will also boost the budget of the public firm which again contributes to the social 
standing of public managers. It therefore follows that bureaucrats are 
budget-maximisers and will use their lobbying power to obtain larger government 
grants (Brown and Jackson, 1986: 172). Bureaucrats would also be tempted to 
misrepresent information and exaggerate the needs of the public enterprise in order 
to secure a larger share of the central budget. In the private sector, on the other 
hand, emphasis is placed on the minimisation of inputs (costs) in order to produce 
the maximum output. Furthermore, managers within the public sector are 
motivated and their careers advanced not by taking innovative risks, but by 
meeting targets and by avoiding mistakes (Murray, 1987). In the private sector 
risk-taking and over-achievement are usually rewarded with higher profits and 
remuneration, whereas very few similar managerial incentives exist in the public 
sector (Murray, 1987). Bureaucratic rules and procedures in the public sector have 
the effect of preventing innovative or exceptional managerial performance. There 
are also very few mechanisms which could account for and monitor such 
performance. There is thus an important difference in the mental approach of 
public and private managers which can be related to the form of ownership. 
Fourthly, the public enterprise has a poor reputation regarding corruption resulting 
in the personal enrichment of public managers and employees (Dreyfus, 1980:208). 
Roy (1980:47) maintains that although corruption does not occur exclusively in the 
public sector, the opportunities are greater in public enterprise than in private. The 
reasons for this are closely related to the separation of ownership and control as 
well as the concomitant lack of proper performance monitoring which will be 
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discussed later. A few other possible causes are worth mentioning. The large size 
of the usually large bureaucratic machine makes it difficult to asses th.e origin of 
corruption and mistakes. Bureaucratic rules could also be used by politicians and 
managers to conceal errors and to prevent detrimental political publicity. Especially 
in strategic enterprises, e.g. arms and gas, employees ·are entrusted with 
clandestine responsibilities and have no duty to disclose information. Within such 
an environment, corrupt officials will have ample opportunity to misappropriate 
scarce resources for their personal enrichment. Haile-Mariam and Mengistu 
(1988: 1570) observe that public enterprises in third world countries, e.g. Mobutu's 
Zaire and Marcos's Philippines, have become a vehicle for corruption and nepotism. 
5.3.3.3 The managerial firm 
The rise of the managerial firm called for a reconsideration of the standard view of 
profit maximisation as the guiding behavioural postulate. · The "property rights" 
school deviated from the mainstream theory, focusing instead on the actions and 
personal needs of managers in pursuing their self-interest (Killick and Commander, 
1988: 1470). The utility maximising model was used to explain the behaviour of 
the firm by observing the actions of individuals within the firm (Furubotn and 
Pejovich, 1972:11 38). Baumol ( 1967) added that except for· a minimum 
acceptable dividend necessary to satisfy the shareholders, the resources of the 
managerial firm are used to maximise managerial utility and provide on-the-job 
amenities. Such amenities include the maximisation of managerial wages and the 
size of the firm. Profits are sacrificed for utilities such as prestige, good labour 
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relations, quiet life, liquidity, security or protected working conditions (Boulding, 
1960:4). 
The managerial firm introduces a class of professional business managers who are 
employed by the firm and who perform their administrative duties irrespective of 
receiving a marginal incentive in profit-sharing (Roy, 1980:46)). An important 
distinction between the modern corporation and the classical firm is that the 
owners of the former have reduced ability to revise or terminate the membership 
of the firm i.e. the management. The attenuation of owner's rights in their firms 
takes the form of a reduced ability to control managerial decision-making (Furubotn 
and Pejovich, 1972: 1149). In such a firm, neither the small shareholder with 
diluted ownership, nor the non-profit-sharing professional manager will have the 
incentive to ensure that the goal of profit maximisation is enthusiastically pursued. 
This separation of ownership and control in the managerial firm means the demise 
of strong property rights, leaving managers with more discretionary power to 
pursue their own ends. 
According to Monsen and Downs (1972:368), the professional managers are 
"economic men who desire to maximise their own lifetime incomes, principally by 
obtaining rapid promotions as a result of pleasing their superiors in the firm". 
These lifetime incomes include both monetary and non-monetary elements. The 
problem is that the monetary incomes of managers do not vary in strict relation to 
the firms profits and they are therefore not encouraged to serve the firm's interest 
by maximising their own income. Instead, managers will primarily try to maximise 
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their own lifetime income which includes non-monetary elements namely power, 
security, leisure and prestige. These elements reduce productive effidency and are 
contrary to the interests of owners and other managers of the firm (Monsen and 
Downs, 1972:355). Managers will, for example, seek to expand expense-account 
benefits in order to raise their total compensation without attracting too much 
attention from the owners. Managers and directors will also be keen to increase 
the size and diversity of their firm in order to enhance their personal prestige and 
remuneration (Gerson, 1990:4). Individuals within the firm may furthermore be 
tempted to shirk as long as the cost of shirking could not be fully determined and 
could be shifted onto others. In this way professional managers could engage in 
discretionary behaviour by appropriating for themselves those benefits that would 
otherwise have accrued to the owners. The size of the infringement on the 
owners' interests will depend largely on the ability of owners to check managerial 
behaviour and to keep it in line with their own objectives (Furubotn and Pejovich, 
1972:1147-1148). 
The argument that managerial behaviour in modern managerial firms is not driven 
by firm orientated interest towards the maximisation of productive efficiency and 
profits seriously endangers the advantage that private enterprise has over its public 
. 
counterpart. In fact, it can be argued that the behaviour of professional managers 
in private firms, in response to. utility maximising incentive structures, is noJ 
superior to bureaucratic managerial behaviour in public enterprises. 
Three important arguments should however be raised to put this criticism in 
90 
perspective and to tip the scale in favour of the private managerial firm. In the first 
place, as Demsetz (1988(b):192-193) points out, the diffused ownership 
managerial firm does not necessarily give rise to more on-the-job consumption, and 
therefore productive inefficiency, than the owner-managed firm. He argues that 
the owner-manager will not refrain from sacrificing profit for more on-the-job 
consumption as long as his/her personal utility is maximised. The owner-manager 
may eventually be pleased to retire to the role of specialised owner and appoint 
professional managers to run the firm. Although owners do not derive any benefit 
from the on-the-job consumption of their managers, they will seldom be in a 
position to prevent such managerial behaviour, because of high monitoring costs. 
Owners will therefore endeavour to neutralise such on-the-job-consumption by a 
cut in managerial salaries. In this way total production costs will remain 
unchanged. In the public sector it will be more difficult to cut wages because of 
the stronger lobbying power of civil servants. 
On the other hand, Furubotn and Pejovich ( 1972: 1152) argue that individuals 
prefer money income over the consumption of non-pecuniary goods, because the 
former offers a greater variety of choices. If managerial salaries were to be 
decreased to cover the full costs to owners of non-pecuniary consumption by 
managers, then labour supply would be expected to decrease to such an extent 
that market forces will push up salaries. They do, however, admit that managerial 
firms with a dispersed ownership structure might have a special productivity 
advantage over less dispersed firms enabling them to finance the costs of 
non-pecuniary consumption. It is not certain what constitutes such a productivity 
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advantage but its existence is evident from the fact that the price level in dispersed 
ownership firms is lower than expected. 
Alchian (1969:349) suggests that the advantage lies in the availability of cheaper 
information due to the fact that specialists are called upon to collect and evaluate 
information while being more fully rewarded for the task. The managerial firm has 
superior internal markets for exchange and reallocation of resources. These 
"knowledge effects" are turned into beneficial internalities and rewards to those 
producing them. 
In the second place, the specialisation of business activity into the different tasks 
of owning and managing, raises the utility levels of those with funds to invest and 
those with managerial skills to sell (Demsetz, 1988(b): 192). Had it not been for 
the separation of ownership and control, potential owners would not have been 
able to combine . their capital with the best available managerial know-how. 
Specialised professional management in fact improves productive efficiency, 
especially in those fields which require a high degree of expertise. The separation 
and specialisation of share-ownership and managerial control, lower the cost to 
society and create opportunities that would otherwise have been unexploited 
(Demsetz, 1988(b): 192). 
In the third place, the market for professional managers in the ,private sector is 
more specialised and open than in the public sector. Appointments of professional 
managers are usually done on the basis of technical. know-how and competency. 
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On these grounds successful outsiders could be preferred ahead of contenders 
from within the firm. Efficiency will always be an important criterion in the 
selection process of the private sector, even though personal motives may come 
to the fore after appointment. This criterion is entrenched in the private sector in 
the light of its tradition of efficiency relative to the public sector. On the other 
hand, bureaucratic appointments are often made on the basis of internal ranking 
and not competence. The person next in line will be favoured and outsiders rarely 
stand a chance. 
In the fourth place, Furubotn and Pejovich ( 1972: 1150-1151) believe that heavy 
competition between managers could exist against the backdrop of a strong 
corporate culture. Managers are motivated to move to better jobs by superior 
performance on present jobs. They will furthermore have the incentive to disclose 
inefficiency in the behaviour of other managers and thereby gaining personal 
advancement in their own careers. Such competition between managers from 
different firms could contribute much to the elimination of productive inefficiency 
in the managerial firm. 
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5.4 PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
5.4.1 Private vs public firms 
On the assumption that a positive correlation exists between the effectiveness of 
performance monitoring by the owners of a firm and the productive efficiency of 
its management, an analysis will now be made of the monitoring capacity of the 
private and public firm respectively. 
In the private owner-managed firm, those whose capital is at risk {private owners) 
exercise direct supervision over managerial behaviour and thoroughly scrutinize the 
activities of the firm. Not only will controlling shareholders perform high quality 
performance monitoring, but they will also refrain from indulging themselves at the 
expense of the firm, because they always bear at least a portion of the costs 
{Gerson, 1990:3). The small p·rivate firm has the advantage that rights to profits 
are clearly defined, and those who exercise these rights have strong incentives to 
supervise management carefully to prevent any form of slack and shirking. 
Another advantage of the small private firm is that the hierarchy of authority is less 
\ 
complicated than in the case of the public firm. Owners are better informed and 
a general duty rests on managers to disclose information. Shareholders also have 
a strong interest in efficient management and vote separately on different issues 
pertaining management. Although the small shareholder is mostly apathetic and 
only the controlling majority shareholder has the motivation to monitor carefully, 
it is the effective monitoring by the latter that ensures high levels of efficiency. 
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The ideal situation is thorough supervision by relatively large, self-interested 
shareholders imposing commercial profitability as main criterion for judging 
managerial performance. 
In the public sector the incentives to monitor managerial performance are poor and 
managers have considerable discretion to pursue their personal agendas. This 
should be seen in the light of the separation of ownership and control in the public 
sector as fully discussed above. The absence of shareholders with a direct interest 
in profits alleviate the pressure on managers to maximise company performance 
(Van de Walle; 1989:605). According to the "property rights" literature, bad 
performance in the public sector could often be ascribed to ill-defined, diffused and 
uncertain property rights (De Alessi, 1980:44). Public sector managers are 
responsible to politicians who represent the real owners, i.e. the public. However, 
the political process is too cumbrous and complex and characterised by too much 
bureaucratic slack to function efficiently as monitoring system for managerial 
performance. The fact that voters do not vote separately for different policies, but 
have to cast a single vote in favour of a complex package of policies, restricting 
their monitoring power. The stake of every citizen in any single public firm is also 
too small for it to render a real incentive to monitor efficiency within the firm. 
Politicians, as vote maximisers, also have little incentive to monitor zealously, 
because their political popularity is more sensitive to macro-economic indicators 
than to the performance of individual corporations. If they do monitor and discover 
bureaucratic inefficiency, they will find it to be politically more glamorous to 
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articulate the problem than to actually implement policies aimed at addressing them 
{Peacock, 1980:35). However, the opportunity costs of monitoring bureaucratic 
activity may be too high for ambitious politicians. They will probably find that it 
is not in their personal political interest to cut out the bureaucratic waste that they 
have unveiled. Civil servants and private interest groups who benefit from such 
bureaucratic waste or inefficient subsidy programmes will surely use ali their 
lobbying power as voters to resist the implementation of proposed trimming 
measures. In the words of Peacock { 1980:35), "politicians are not likely to greet 
their constituents with the news that they are unwilling to facilitate their entree to 
reap the benefits which bureaucrats may control by their discretionary powers". 
5.4.2 The managerial firm 
Many advantages that private ownership held over public ownership in respect of 
performance monitoring, were sacrificed with the rise of the managerial firm. 
Owners of managerial firms are by nature profit-maximisers and will be motivated 
actively to strive for productive efficiency. In order to translate this motivation into 
action, they must be in a position to monitor and influence managerial behaviour 
to ensure that it is in accordance with these motivations .. There are, however, 
certain limitations preventing them from monitoring management effectively. An 
important limitation is that the managerial firm is characterised by the separation 
of ownership (shareholders) and control (management) as well as by the diffusion 
and proliferation of shareholders. These characteristics contribute to a lack of 
performance monitoring and therefore reduced ·productive efficiency. 
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It is important to elaborate on the diffusion and proliferation of shareholding in the 
managerial firm in order to analyse the capacity of owners effectively to monitor 
performance within the firm. Demsetz and Lehn (Demsetz, 1988(b): 196-205) 
explain the proliferation of ownership as follows. Managerial firms in certain 
industries require large scale production in order to maximise profit. A larger 
competitively viable size requires an expansion of the firm's capital resources, 
which again means a rise in the market value of a given fraction of ownership. The 
fact that individual investors must now invest more to obtain a given fraction of 
ownership should, in itself, reduce the degree to which ownership is concentrated. 
In other words, scale requirements create the need for large scale equity capital to 
the effect that a diffuse ownership structure is inevitable. In order to maintain a 
concentrated ownership structure,· existing owners can provide additional capital 
themselves by committing more of their personal wealth to a single enterprise. 
However, risk aversion implies that they will only buy additional shares at reduced, 
risk-compensating prices. This could persuade owners to relinquish the structure 
of concentrated ownership. If this happens and the number of shareholders 
increases, the wealth of each investor is less dependent on the success of a single 
firm. Investors have the opportunity to diversify and to spread their risks by 
investing in a variety of concerns. The more diffuse the ownership becomes, 
however, the more difficult it will be to implement effective performance monitoring 
by shareholders with relatively small shareholding. 
Demsetz and Lehn (Demsetz, 1988(b) :202) furthermore submit that such diffusion 
of ownership creates the incentive for shirking by minority shareholders in the 
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sense that the costs of spending their time on pursuing other personal interests. 
rather than on monitoring managerial performance are borne by all the shareholders 
in proportion to the number of shares owned by each. The more concentrated the 
ownership, the more responsibility will be on every shareholder to apply his/_her 
mind, time and effort more diligently to the interests of the firm, because the costs 
for failing to do so will be spread over fewer owners. 
The diffusion of shareholding further contributes to the separation of ownership 
and control, which (as discussed above) is prevalent in the managerial firm. 
Together, these attributes cause already isolated shareholders to be further 
removed from the firm's actual affairs. De facto ownership, dispersed across a 
large number of shareholders and separated from management,, is stripped from its 
control function and converted into de jure ownership. The shareholding of the 
individual owner is simply too small and too remote to render effective control over 
managerial performance. 
Furthermore, managerial activities in large managerial firms are growing in 
complexity and calls for expert knowledge and specialised experience. 
Shareholders are therefore also intellectually separated from management. 
Consequently, shareholders are generally ignorant of day to day managerial 
decisions and of alternative policies available to the firm (Monsen and Downs, 
1972:353). This, together with their inability to judge and act upon small 
deviations in quality of performance, hamper shareholders in their task of 
monitoring productive efficiency. In view of rising capital costs, risk-aversion 
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objectives and a lack of managerial expertise, shareholders have no choice but to 
accept a more diffuse ownership structure and a 'reduced capacity to monitor 
managerial· performance. This choice would be consistent with shareholder 
utility-maximising behaviour. Shareholders will then leave the task of managing 
the firm and monitoring performance to professional managers, whom they appoint, 
and rather concentrate on their specialised task as investors and owners. 
The deterioration of the monitoring ability in the managerial firm has serious 
implications for productive efficiency. The lack of effective monitoring creates an 
environment in which corporate managers have the freedom to strive for the 
maximisation of their own interests (as discussed above) instead of owners' 
objectives related to profit maximisation. The conflict of interests between 
managers and owners is resolved in favour of corporate managers, due to the lack 
of powerful monitoring owners. If it is assumed that managerial interests do not 
necessarily coincide with those of shareholders, the effect of such lack of control 
will be that corporate resources are not used entirely in pursuit of shareholder 
profit. Veblen (1924) and Galbraith (1968) maintain that a positive relationship 
exists between ownership concentration and the profit rate. 
Haile-Mariam and Mengistu (1988: 1584) hold the view that the attenuation of 
ownership and the abdication of control by owners apply to the owner-shareholder 
in a private managerial firm as well as in a public enterprise. For reasons already 
discussed, the private shareholder has to revert to a hands-off approach and 
cannot influence managerial decisions on a day to day basis. Shareholder's rights 
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are limited to electing and removing directors and ensuring that they abide by the 
applicable state laws, articles of incorporation and common law. It is submitted, 
however, that the real owners of the public firm, i.e. the citizens, are even further 
removed from its daily affairs and t~at ownership is also more proliferated than in 
the case of the private managerial firm, due to the nature of the political process. 
5.4.3 Problem areas 
Several problem areas hamper improved performance monitoring by shareholders 
in private managerial firms. Firstly, shareholders of the managerial firm usually 
entrust the board of directors with the task of monitoring managerial performance. 
The board of directors, however, are restricted in their ability to monitor managerial 
performance. They lack the necessary autonomy, because top management 
usually controls the board through proxy agreements and through the 
representation of key executives on the board. Key executives are therefore 
self-perpetuating and will be dismissed only in the case of blatant misconduct 
(Monsen and Downs, 1972:354). 
Secondly, the basic problem encountered by shareholders is the high cost of 
gathering information on managerial inefficiency. Managers who control the 
dissemination of information regarding the activities of the firm, will tend to conceal 
unfavourable data from shareholders and directors. According to Tullock* (Monsen 
and Downs, 1972:358-361) managers at every level will tend to screen information 
* "A General Theory of Politics" (undated and unpublished mimeographed manuscript). discussed in Monsen and Downs• 
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in their possession so that only data favourable to themselves will be passed on to 
their superiors. Because they are in no position to pressure management in 
maximising profits, owners of managerial firms will revert to the role of satisficers 
who desire satisfactory growth .in profits, uninterrupted dividends and a gradual 
appreciation of the market price of shares (Monsen and Downs, 1972:352,368). 
Thirdly, the large size of the managerial firm causes it to develop a bureaucratic 
management structure which cannot be effectively controlled by those in charge 
(Monsen and Downs, 1972:356-361 ). Managers are forced to delegate authority 
to employees, but are at the same time prevented from fully monitoring use of that 
authority (Monsen and Downs, 1972:369). This causes the management 
systematically to deviate from ownership objectives as discussed above. The 
bureaucratic structure makes it impossible for efficient control of managers by 
owners and of employees by managers. 
Fourthly, since it is difficult to m'easure the individual contributions to the firm's 
profits, managers are inclined to pursue policies that serve their own objectives 
instead of that of the firm. Superiors will also be pleased by and promote those 
subordinates who pose no threat to their positions as managers, and who will 
further their personal interests even if it may impair the firm's efficiency. In this 
way distorted performance criteria are laid down by management. 
Fifthly, the power struggle between owners and managers over who will have 
control over surplus funds generated within the firm is presently being resolved in 
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favour of managers; thereby depriving shareholders not only of their role as capital 
providers, but also ·of an important incentive to monitor productive efficiency. If 
all surplus funds were to be paid out to shareholders in the form of annual 
dividends, they would have. the opportunity to reconsider their investment on a 
regular basis. They would be motivated to monitor the firm's performance in order 
to decide whether to reinvest or disinvest such funds. Such continuous monitoring 
incentive would certainly keep management alert and efficient. 
However, according to Jensen (Goodman and Loveman, 1991 :35) managers have 
been consistently unwilling to reward owners with dividend payouts, preferring to 
hold on to surpluses. They are reluctant to do so for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
is in the interest of managers to prevent owners from voting with their capital and 
making new decisions on how to invest the surplus capital. They would not want 
to be in a position where they continuously have to persuade shareholders to 
reinvest surplus funds rather than diverting it to more efficient investment 
opportunities. Another reason is that retained profits and excess cash provide 
managers with autonomy vis-a-vis the capital markets. They are relieved from the 
thorough scrutiny of capital providers as well as from their responsibility to 
convince the capital markets anew to supply funds as sound economic projects 
arise (Jensen, 1989:66). Free cash flow, i.e. cash flow in excess of that required 
to fund all investment projects with positive net present valu.es, should rather be 
distributed to shareholders in order to maximise the efficiency and value of the 
firm. However, very few mechanisms or incentives exist to compel or motivate 
managers to distribute these funds. Jensen (1989:66) reports that in 1988, the 
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1000 largest companies in the USA generated a cash flow of $1,6 billion of which 
less than 10% were distributed as dividends or share repurchases. 
Finally, excess cash provides managers with the opportunity to increase the size 
of the firms they run beyond that which maximises shareholder wealth, through 
capacity expansion and diversification (Goodman and Loveman, 1991 :35}. 
Managers have the incentive to maximise company size as a goal in itself, because 
executive salaries are strongly related to increases in corporate size rather than 
value (as discussed above) (Jensen, 1989:66}. Corporate growth also enhances 
the social stature, public prestige and political power of senior executives. 
Managers typically justify their endeavours to increase the size and diversity of the 
firm by explaining that it is aimed at reducing the risk to shareholders. Gerson 
(1990:4} maintains, however, that the onus should be on shareholders themselves 
to diversify their portfolios by investing in several different companies, and not on 
the single firm to diversify its activities to the extent that it incurs efficiency losses 
stemming from the lack of expertise in the new lines of business. The real motive 
behind this managerial goal is more probably that managers would want to reduce 
their own vulnerability and enhance their personal prestige. 
The independence from capital markets, the availability of large cash balances and 
the incentive of maximising corporate size, have tempted managers, especially 
those in industries with little long term growth potential, to waste funds on 
investments with low returns and to apply it in an inefficient way (Jensen, 
1989:66-67}. The result is not only the inefficient allocation of scarce funds but 
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also the dissipation thereof through- productive inefficiency and waste without 
being checked by the scrutiny of shareholders. 
5.4.4 Monitoring benefits of the managerial firm 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned problems, a case could still be made out in 
favour of the private managerial firm vis-a-vis the public firm in respect of 
performance monitoring by owners·. In the first place, ownership and control are 
more separated in the public sector than in the case of the private managerial firm. 
As explained _above, shareholders in the managerial firm could pressure 
management by threatening to vote with their feet and change their investment. 
An important difference between the right of a citizen in a state where public 
enterprises are operating, and a shareholder of a private managerial firm, is the 
right of the private sha·reholder to buy and sell shares (Haile-Mariam and Mengistu, 
· 1988: 1584). Citizens can indeed influence managerial policy in the long term by 
exercising their political voting power. The political process is, however, a 
cumbrous and long-winded way to control managerial behaviour. Citizens cannot 
vote when they are dissatisfied, but have to wait for a general election. Between 
elections they can only raise their complaints with political representatives who 
could put pressure on public managers via the appropriate minister. The 
unavailability of information, the complexity of the channels of authority and the 
inability of citizens to invest or disinvest individually, renders monitoring by the true 
owners of public enterprises over management highly ineffective. Disillusioned 




to monitor managerial behaviour when they decide on whether to sell their shares. 
The information basis for such monitoring will be better than in the public sector, 
because of the statutory obligation on the managerial firm (especially if listed on 
the stock exchange) to disclose minimum information on profits and losses. 
The incentive to monitor will also be strengthened by the payment of dividends to 
shareholders. On receipt of a dividend, shareholders are forced to evaluate the 
firm's performance, in order to decide whether to reinve'st the dividend in the same 
firm or to look for more profitable investment opportunities. If no dividends are 
paid out, it would be a signal to shareholders that something is wrong and that 
their investment may be at risk. In this way the shareholders will maintain interest 
in the performance of the firm. It could therefore be argued that private ownership 
will still be preferable to public ownership, because of this residual incentive to 
monitor managerial performance. 
In the second place, Demsetz ( 1988(b): 1 94-197) asserts that the ownership 
structure of the modern managerial firm is endogenously determined by competitive 
selection in which various cost advantages and disadvantages are balanced to 
arrive at an equilibrium form of organisation. He treats monitoring cost on a par 
with any other production cost. In the case of the high-monitoring cost business, 
owners will be inclined to cut managerial salaries, but allow considerable on-the-job 
consumption. Production costs will thereby stay the same as managers are being 
paid according to their productivity. Equilibrium will be achieved when the sum of 
the on-the-job consumption and salaries will equal the production cost in the 
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low-monitoring cost firm where on-the-job consumption is restricted and managerial 
salaries increased. In this way provision is made within the managerial market for 
different preferences of managers regarding the composition of their total 
remuneration, i.e. pecuniary and non-pecuniary components. In the public sector, 
however, it is difficult to adjust managerial salaries downward to maintain such 
equilibrium, because of the large bureaucratic structure and the strong bargaining 
power of public trade unions. 
In the third place, there exists some scope for concentration of ownership in the 
managerial firm. Especially in small economies, there usually are majority. 
shareholders who have the incentive to monitor managerial performance. Even if 
no majority shareholders exist, Demsetz ( 1988(b): 197-200) avers that " ... dispersed 
ownership will become sufficiently concentrated to give proper guidance to, 
perhaps to boot out, an inefficient management". Small shareholders could decide 
to form ad hoc power blocs with other shareholders when it is necessary to act 
strongly against inefficient management. The mere possibility of concentration of 
shareholding by way of concerted action or take-overs will keep managers in 
check, as already discussed. However, the process of concentrating ownership is 
very costly and will only be embarked upon as a last resort. Demsetz (1988:198) 
argues that a more direct linking of the interests of ownership and control is 
necessary to safeguard productive efficiency. The self-interest of shareholders 
suggests that they will not easily abandon their control over their assets, except 
to those who have similar interests. They could be persuaded to entrust their 
control to top management, especially in those cases where the interests of 
106 
management and owners are kept in line by incentive schemes, for example 
stock-based managerial compensation and management shareholding. The mere 
fact therefore that shareholders entrust the management of their capital to 
professional managers, must at least mean that the goals and motivations of such 
managers c~uld not be too much out of line with that of their own. Gerson 
( 1 990:4) added that managerial abuse could be curbed by tough and powerful 
controlling shareholders, even if it means a further concentration of ownership. He 
therefore regards potential managerial abuse in diffused ownership firms as a more 
serious threat to productive efficiency than the potential "abuse" by strong 
controlling owners. A strong argument could be made out favouring a 
concentrated ownership structure in the light of the efficiency benefits of more 
effective monitoring. 
In the fourth place, there is empirical evidence to the effect that the diffuse 
ownership structure of the private managerial firm, is not significantly related to 
lower profit rates or productive inefficiency in the private sector. Demsetz and 
Lehn (Demsetz, 1988(b) :202) studied ownership data from 511 major US firms and 
found no significant correlation between the degree of ownership concentration or 
diffusion and the profit rate. They argue that the higher cost and reduced profits 
associated with a more diffuse ownership structure and the loosening of control of 
professional management, could be neutralised by lower capital acquisition cost or 
other profit enhancing aspects of diffuse ownership. Unfortunately, they do not 
expand on this simple explanation. If such evidence should be corroborated, 
however, a case could possibly be made out that the separation of ownership and 
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control has a less detrimental effect on prod.uctive efficiency in the private than in 
the public sector. This will be the case if the public firm do not have the 
corresponding advantage of lower capital acquisition cost related to a diffuse 
ownership structure. Included in the costs of capital acquisition in the public 
sector, is the loss of incentives due to the distortions created by raised taxes. 
In the fifth place, the managerial control over surplus funds and the consequent 
lack of performance monitoring by capital markets have to be addressed. A 
solution gaining ground in the USA is the phenomenon of Leveraged Buyouts 
whereby constituent parts of dismembered conglomerates are sold to managers 
who then run the firm as controlling shareholders with a greater incentive to 
monitor efficiently (Gerson, 1990: 5). Debts in the form of junk bonds replace 
equity as the source of capital. 
Gerson (1990:5) argues that "with all the right incentives and with the whip of 
debt-servicing.payments cracking over their heads they can be expected to run 
hard and to spare no effort". Financial institutions, as capital suppliers, have 
considerable expertise _and experience in monitoring managerial efficiency, and 
could prove to be an adequate replacement for monitoring by shareholders. They 
have a concentrated interest in the debtor firm and real financial incentives to 
monitor the way in which their funds are utilised. 
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5.5 RENT-SEEKING COSTS 
For a variety of socio-political reasons, government policies are sometimes 
designed to maintain economic rents at artificially high levels by way of tariffs, 
input quotas, entry regulations and restrictions on competition. The existence of 
economic rent will trigger managerial effort aimed at capturing this rent. 
Rent-seeking efforts in this sense are wasteful per se and could prevail in the public 
or private sectors of the economy. 
Bureaucratic managers of public enterprises have ample opportunity and motivation 
to practice rent-seeking activities and turn government policies and regulations in 
their favour. As discussed above, public managers adopt an input approach to 
management. Higher costs and inefficiency will support their quest for more 
government assistance. The costs of lobbying for government favours are wasteful 
per se, because it is not aimed at producing goods or services more efficiently 
(Buchanan and Flowers, 1987: 118-124). It may well result in surplus funds for the 
individual firm, but part of it will be consumed by the very endeavours to acquire 
them. Managers will spend a lot of time and effort persuading politicians to raise 
subsidies rather than trying to remove the rationale behind it, namely productive 
inefficiency. Once government assistance has been obtained, public managers will 
again try to waste it by way of managerial slack and inefficiency in order to create 
the opportunity for further rent-seeking. 
Paul Starr ( 1987) contends that profit-seeking private enterprises (especially large 
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managerial firms) servicing public amenities will find it in their interest to lobby for 
expanded public spending with no less vigour than did their public sector 
predecessors. Although, rent-seeking also occurs in the private sector, it is 
submitted that more incentives for rent-seeking exists within the public sector. 
Public managers have easier access to the central budget via the political hierarchy 
and could be more tempted to indulge in these unproductive activhies. In the 
private sector, however, there is a way in which rent-seeking activities could be 
controlled and minimised. The right to capture the economic rent created by 
government policies could be auctioned by way of a competitive bidding process. 
The winning bid would be more or less equal to the available rent, offering only 
normal profits to the "winner". The funds saved in this way could also be 
channelled back to the people by not rai_sing taxes. 
5.6 INNOVATION 
Except in the case of explicit government policy to the contrary, public enterprises 
•' 
spend less on research and the development of cost saving innovations than their 
private counterparts. Murray ( 1987), in arguing a case for the public enterprise, 
admitted that the performan.ce of the public sector in respect of innovation had 
been poor. This means that public enterprises often lack the much needed 
technology to obtain dynamic productive efficiency. Instead, the surpluses 
generated by public enterprises are used to cross-subsidise other industries, to 
inflate salaries or to improve working conditions under the pressure of trade unions. 
110 
Public managers and employees who want to avoid the risk and extra responsibility 
of a research and development programme, may also be tempted to dissipate the 
surplus through the bureaucratic slack and x-inefficiency. The result is that public 
firms are often over-capitalised with outdated technology. This would mean long 
term productive inefficiency in the public sector. 
Wolf ( 1979: 120-122) suggests that a bias against new technology in some state 
departments could lead to productive inefficiency. The education industry in the 
USA for example resisted the experimental use of computer-aided instruction, 
which might reduce the demand for teachers, and stuck to the notion that "familiar 
and simple is better". Wolf also argues that in some other public institutions like 
the military services and space programmes, the contrary applies in that the goal 
of technological development is pursued to the extent that productive efficiency is 
reduced. The latter is conducive to budget-maximising behaviour resulting in 
over-supply (as discussed in the previous chapter). It is further submitted that 
such a bias towards technological development in the public sector, will only exist 
in respect of industries where vigorous international competition exists ( e.g. 
military and medical). 
Schumpeter (1954:Chap 7) held the view that large modern corporations and 
private monopolies have greater incentives to undertake cost-saving technical 
innovations by way of research and development than the smaller competitive 
firms. The freedom from competitive pressures act as a spur to innovative 
investment since the monopoly profits enable the firm to risk the expenditure 
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without the possibility of free-riding competitors sharing the benefits of investment 
without· paying for it (Tregennµ-Piggott, 1980:68). Large firms ha.ve greater 
resources available for research and development and could expect a higher 
potential return on any successful venture. These factors provide the incentives 
to .the modern c~rporation to spend more on technical advances which, if 
successful, could lead to the reduction in costs and the possible expansion of 
output. 
Another. factor in favour of the large modern corporation is that financial 
institutions are more willing to support large profitable corporations. These 
corporations would of course be in a favourable position to fund the greater part 
of the costs of research and development internally by the application of retained 
profits. As argued earlier, the modern managerial firm is inclined to pile up cash 
reserves instead of paying out dividends to shareholders. An example of this is 
the Ford Motor Company sitting with cash reserves of $15 billion in 1989 (Jensen, 
1989:66). Apart from the availability of funds, most Western economies operate 
a patent system, offering inventors a temporary· legal monopoly for a fixed period 
before competitors could reap the benefits of the inventor's initial investment in 
research and development. Patents offer essential incentives to inventive 
corporations, but the fact that it is only temporary, means that the benefits of 
research and development will eventually trickle down through the whole economy, 
thereby lowering costs· and enhancing productive .efficiency. This would involve 
an outward shift of the production possibility curve. 
112 
5.7 COMPETENCY 
Roy ( 1 980:46) asserts that the incompetency of public managers is an important 
contributory factor to the productive inefficiency of the public enterprise. The 
incompetency often arises from the fact that public managers are chosen for 
reasons other than capability, most notably political reasons. 
This is especially the case in the event of a change of government in developing 
countries. The new regime will be pressured by its constituency to reward party 
loyalties with jobs in the government administration and in the management of 
public enterprises. A benign corps of officials and managers could facilitate the 
implementation of a new economic policy, while a hostile corps could be in a 
position to slow down the process of change considerably. With every change in 
government a degree of affirmative action will take place on this level. If however, 
this policy goes too far and incumbent management is replaced without 
consideration being given to competency and experience, the cost will be high in 
terms of productive inefficiency. 
After the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, it became clear that 
affirmative action was going to be a priority in the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme of the Government of National Unity. The public sector was the natural 
starting point and nearly all the new appointees in state departments were from 
previously disadvantaged segments of society. The effect thereof on productive 
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efficiency will have to be monitored, but will probably be negative in the light of 
the lack of expertise and experience of the new appointees. The firm will incur 
additional costs in the form of extra training and supervision in an attempt to close 
the productivity gap (Black, 1995:7). 
According to Van de Walle (1989:606), the most serious constraints on public 
policy are not to be found in its design, but in its implementation by extremely thin 
administrative hierarchies with limited means and capabilities. The administrations 
are simply not sophisticated enough to process available information efficiently, to 
apply it to a variety of political and economic goals, and to adjust quickly to new 
and changing circumstances.· 
5.8 SUMMARY 
In this chapter it was illustrated that the conventional private firm has an 
undisputed advantage over the public firm in respect of productive efficiency. The 
determining factors were discussed and it was then explained how the modern 
managerial firni sacrificed much of this high ground that it previously held over the 
public sector. The contemporary critique against the private managerial firm is that 
by the separation of ownership and management, the diffusion of ownership, the 
bureaucratic structures of management, the large size of the firm, the complexity 
of management as well as the divergence of motives and goals, productive 
efficiency has been reduced. The separation of ownership and control had the 
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effect of overriding managerial incentives to be efficient and reducing owners' 
capacity to monitor managerial performance. Diffused ownership caused 
shareholders to lose interest in the day to day management of the firm and to 
revert to a hands-off approach. A bureaucratic structure provided ample 
opportunity for the concealment of inefficiency and the pursuit of contradictory 
self-interests. The large size of the firm and complexity of management, coupled 
with the limited capacity of managers, reduced the effectiveness of monitoring 
delegated authority by superiors. A divergence of motives and goals caused this 
delegation to result in inefficiency. 
However, a case has been made out that, notwithstanding the above-mentioned 
sacrifices, productive efficiency is still higher in the private managerial firm than in 
its public counterpart, in respect of each of the conventional factors mentioned 
above. 
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CHAPTER 6: SYNOPSIS 
The debate on whether public or private ownership of firms renders the most 
efficient outcome, both in the allocative and productive sense, has altered 
drastically along with the change in the organisational and market structure of the 
modern firm. A synopsis of the argument, in respect of the allocative and 
productive efficiency set out in the preceding chapters will be illustrated with the 












With the inception of the free-market system, based on private ownership, 
economies found it difficult to maintain acceptable levels of allocative efficiency. 
The neoclassical theory of perfect competition assumed that an invisible hand will 
guide the perfectly competitive market to an allocatively efficient equilibrium at 
point E where price equal marginal costs. However, it failed to take into account 
various market failures in the form of inadequate information, public goods, 
externalities, inequality and, most importantly, the lack of perfect competition and 
the presence of monopolies. The case of the natural monopoly is especially 
important, because, since it renders very little scope for the improvement of 
competition, the efficiency effects of a change in ownership could be measured 
more easily. 
As discussed, the natural monopoly cannot maintain marginal cost pricing and 
reacts by undersupplying output while raising prices. The natural monopoly in 
Figure 6 is assumed to be sector Y, while sector X is perfectly competitive, and 
consequently the equilibrium of the privately owned monopoly will be at a point 
such as M. As a counter measure governments decided to control these firms 
either by way of regulating them or by taking over their ownership and then using 
such control to expand output by setting price equal to marginal cost. It should be 
pointed out that the intricacies of the regulation of the private firm fall outside the 
ambit of this dissertation and emphasis was instead placed on the effects of 
control through ownership. Under public control a higher level of allocative 
efficiency is obtained by increasing output and setting price equal to marginal cost. 
Allowing for the distortionary effect of a tax cum subsidy mix, the equilibrium will 
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shift from point M to point R inside the production possibility curve (TT). This 
would mean an improvement of allocative efficiency if point R represents a higher 
social welfare than point M. · 
The rise of the public enterprise, however, created the environment in which public 
failure became a grim reality. The first cause of public failure was the deficiency 
of the political system and the resultant separation of ownership by citizens and 
control by politicians and bureaucrats. This has led to public enterprises being 
used by vote-maximising politicians as political instruments and by bureaucrats for 
the satisfaction of personal interests. The result was an oversupply of relatively 
unpopular public goods and a shift of the equilibrium from point R to point P, 
indicating a loss of allocative efficiency. 
The rise of the modern managerial private firm introduced a firm with some 
similarities to the public firm in respect of its size and the separation of ownership 
by shareholders and control by management. However, some of these 
characteristics have the effect of inducing management to lower monopoly prices 
and expand output and thereby improving allocative efficiency. Sales maximisation 
replaced profit maximisation as behavioural postulate, while increased competition 
(actual or potential) among large enterprises as well as the growing importance of 
the public image of the modern conglomerate contributed to an increased level of 
allocative efficiency in the economy. · The net effect of the rise of the modern 
managerial firm was a movement of the previous private equilibrium at point M 
along the production possibility curve to a point somewhere between points E and 
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M, the exact position of which will be dealt with below. 
While the private sector had to struggle to restore its poor reputation regarding 
allocative efficiency, it always held the upper hand vis-a-vis the public sector in 
maintaining acceptable levels of productive efficiency. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the lack of productive efficiency in the public firm can be 
explained by the severe pressure from trade unions, low levels of managerial 
motivation or incentives, as well as poor performance monitoring. Although 
productive efficiency is usually associated with the degree of competition in the 
market, the above-mentioned factors are inherent to the ownership of the firm, 
whether private or public, and their effects on productive efficiency support the 
argument that the privately owned monopoly could be expected to outperform its 
state-owned counterpart on the ownership criterion alone. This can be illustrated 
by a shift in the public equilibrium from point P to a point lying further inside the 
production possibility curve, such as point P'. A conventional private monopoly 
will also experience organisational slack and labour inefficiency, but the effect 
thereof on the private equilibrium would be less pronounced, e.g. such as a move 
from point M to point M'. 
Private monopolies furthermore have advantages over public enterprises in respect 
of dynamic efficiency. Because more is being spent on research and the 
development of cost-saving innovations, it could be argued that the production 
possibility curve would undergo an outward shift from TT to TT', thereby changing 
the private equilibrium from point M' to point M". This shift could even be more 
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· pronounced in the case of the managerial firm where more surplus funds in the 
form of retained profits are available for research and development. 
' 
As discussed before, the rise of the managerial firm, which could also be a natural 
monopoly, brought along an improvement in allocative efficiency illustrated, e.g., 
by a movement along the production possibility curve, or, given dynamic 
productive efficiency, from point M" to point MM. However, several factors 
contributed to an inevitable sacrifice in respect of productive efficiency, such as 
the separation of ownership and control, the high costs of gathering information, 
the large size and bureaucratic structure, the lack of monitoring by owners coupled 
with increasing managerial autonomy, and the availability of surplus funds. This 
reduction of productive efficiency could lead to a final private equilibrium at a point 
such as MM'. 
While it is very difficult to estimate the relative importance of the different effects 
of ownership factors on allocative and productive efficiency respectively, the 
suggestion in this dissertation is that the final equilibrium of the modern managerial 
private firm or monopoly {at point MM'), would represent a higher level of social 
welfare than that of the publicly owned firm or monopoly {at point P'). 
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